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ABSTRACT 
 
The world is facing environmental challenges in particular the surging growth of 
greenhouse gases emissions. In line with these challenges, the developed world is funding 
sustainable development in poor countries, assumed to have low willingness to pay for 
environmental quality improvements. We are therefore directed to asking the question, 
“Does financial sustainable development assistance improve environmental air quality in 
poor countries and if so, by what magnitude?” The study attempts to expose whether 
financial development assistance reduces greenhouse gases emissions in Sub-Sahara 
Africa or not. With regards to value addition to this field, the study attempts to introduce 
the consumer theory of utility maximization in explaining how financial sustainable 
development assistance shifts the country’s optimal consumption levels and it also 
attempts to introduce the Marshallian productivity theory in its suggested post-cure 
financial sustainable development assistance model. Empirically, the study makes use of 
an econometric programme, STATA 9, to estimate the random effects panel data model in 
three functional forms, linear, quadratic and cubic forms, linking greenhouse gases 
emissions to sustainable development assistance, per capita income, energy use and 
manufacturing share. In addition, it also estimates the dynamic panel data model, linking 
the current greenhouse gases emissions to previous emissions in SSA countries. 
 
The study finds no evidence that financial sustainable development assistance improves 
environmental air quality in SSA. The findings provide evidence that the quadratic 
functional form in terms of the sustainable development assistance variable provides the 
best fit for SSA data whereas the cubic functional form has the worst fit. While the 
explicit link between environmental quality and per capita income professed by various 
empirical studies is not refuted, this study finds evidence that increases in current per 
capita incomes increase greenhouse gases emissions in SSA. In addition, energy use and 
manufacturing share are found to be significant determinants of variations in greenhouse 
gases emissions in SSA in both the linear and quadratic functional forms. But in the 
dynamic random effects estimation, the study finds no evidence of a significant influence 
of previous greenhouse gases emissions on current emissions although there is an 
indication of a positive relationship. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Global warming has become the major challenge of the world today. Average global 
temperatures are rising to unprecedented levels due to unsustainable burning of fossils in 
production, with some countries experiencing deaths from heat waves. Human economic 
activities that emit greenhouse gases are behind the deterioration of the environmental 
quality. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)’s annual report (2007) 
reports that the United Nations (UN) has convened several conferences to discuss the 
challenge of climate change. In 2002, several nations met in Kyoto, Japan and launched 
the Kyoto Protocol, which sets international standards for reducing global greenhouse 
gases emissions levels. The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012 and in December 2007, 
countries converged in Bali, Indonesia for the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) conference, which launched international negotiations to draft a 
successor treaty to Kyoto Protocol. The Bali conference created the road map, which 
commits nations to negotiating a new climate change treaty by 2009. 
 
Of all the greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide ( 2CO ) has the greatest share of the globe’s 
total emissions. According to World Bank Development Indicators Statistics (WBDIS, 
2007), in 2000 the share of 2CO  was 74% comprising of 55% from fuel and cement 
production and 19% from land use change and forestry. The other 26% share was from 
nitrous oxide (9%), methane (16%) and other gases (1%). Global emissions of 
greenhouse gases have rapidly increased over the years, from a total of less than two 
billion metric tons in 1950 to over six billion metric tons in 2004 as reported in WBDIS 
(2006).  
 
Euro Statistics (2008) indicate that in Western Europe, four countries namely United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain are among the top 20 national fossil fuel 2CO  
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emitters. In 2004, North America comprising of the United States (US) and Canada was 
the highest fossil fuel 2CO  emitting region of the world with 1.82 billion tons of carbon 
as reported by WBDIS (2007). It was a 1.6% increase from the 2003 figure. But because 
of rapid growth in other economies like China, emissions from North America have 
shrunk from 46.4% of the global total in 1950 to 24.3% in 2004. The WBDIS (2007) 
further reports that the second world economies, like China have experienced rapid 
growth in green house gases emissions. Growth in 2CO  emissions in China was virtually 
continuous until 1996 as the Centrally Planned Asia’s contribution rose from 1.4% of the 
world total emissions in 1950 to 15.6% in 1996. 
 
Unlike in developed countries and second world economies, the WBDIS (2007) show 
that Africa’s fossil fuel 2CO  emissions are low in both absolute and per capita terms. 
Total emissions for Africa have increased 12.1 fold since 1950 reaching 314 million 
metric tons of carbon in 2004, but still less than the emissions of some single nations 
including the US, China, Japan, among others. Emissions from all fuel sources have 
grown in the African region over time with liquid fuels accounting for 44%, solid fuels 
accounting for 34.2%, and gas fuels accounting for 12.4%. South Africa alone accounts 
for 38% of the total continental emissions from fossil fuels and cement production. 
 
The general consensus in most poor countries is that they should not be too concerned 
about greenhouse gases emissions while their populations are starving. Their economies 
are still poor to the extent that fuel and cement production ( 2CO  emitting processes) are 
considered essential for rapid economic growth. These economies also argue that though 
their total emissions are growing, they still make an insignificant share of the world’s 
total. On the basis of this reasoning, developing countries have been so reluctant in 
devoting significant resources to fighting the surging growth of greenhouse gases 
emissions. However, it is feared that since developing countries will in the future reach 
the current Chinese phase of economic growth and the developed world phase, the 
environment, with the current levels of emissions, will not have the capacity to sustain 
life.  
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While the deterioration of the environmental air quality because of economic activities 
has become a major concern in most developed countries in particular the European 
Union (EU), the USA and Japan, it has not been considered as a special issue in most 
developing countries. Developing countries argue that they do not have enough resources 
to finance environmental air quality improvements given their very low output levels, 
insignificant world share of greenhouse gases emissions and starving populations. In the 
environmental economics literature (Kolstad, 2000), it is argued that the poor have very 
low Willingness to Pay (WTP)1 for environmental quality improvements while the rich’s 
WTP for environmental quality is high. Kolstad (2000) argues that the rich whose WTP 
is very high should compensate the poor for the incurred opportunity cost of 
environmental quality improvements in order to instill interest for environmental quality 
in the poor. In support of this argument, the flow of financial assistance for sustainable 
development from rich countries to poor countries has increased over the past three 
decades. 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s annual report of 2007 reports 
that by 1990 Sustainable Development Assistance (SDA) inflow to Sub-Sahara Africa 
(SSA) had over tripled its average of the 1970s decade. In 1990, SSA countries received 
a total of US$17.2 billion from SDA providers that include the World Bank, Japan’s 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), the United States (US), Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), United Nations, among others. Until 1999, SDA inflow trend of 
SSA was increasing since 1970. 
 
In 2007, the World Bank Annual Report reports that in 1992 the Japanese fiscal 
authorities announced Japan’s intention to substantially enhance and increase its ODA in 
the environmental field, in order to contribute to the realization of sustainable 
development. The authorities said, “Environmental issues in developing countries are 
critical problems because they threaten to seriously damage not only developing 
                                                 
1 Willingness to Pay (WTP) is the cost that an individual is willing to incur in order to get a unit of the    
required product.   
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countries themselves, but also the entire international community, including Japan.” The 
country allocated 900 billion to one trillion yen for assisting environmental issues in 
developing countries during a five-year period from fiscal year 1992. However, over this 
fiscal year period, the target was exceeded by 40% as 1440 billion yen was provided.   
 
The UNEP annual report (2007) reports that a joint UNEP-World Bank initiative, 
“Carbon Finance for Sustainable Energy in Africa (CFSEA)” is working with host 
government agencies, banks and project sponsors to develop an initial pipeline of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) investment opportunities in Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, 
Mozambique and Zambia. UNEP is working with funding from Sweden, Spain and 
Finland to overcome barriers to the carbon market in SSA countries and enhance the 
capacity of the private sector to access carbon finance. 
 
The 2007 WBDIS indicates that in 1998 ODA to SSA fell from the 1994 figure of 
US$18.8 billion to US$13.5 billion. Since it had the greatest share of the total SDA to 
SSA, its fall caused the total SDA to SSA to fall to US$12.3 billion in 1999 from the 
1990 figure of US$17.2 billion, despite the fact that US aid, which is mostly 
humanitarian, was increasing during this period. Figure 1 illustrates that SDA per capita 
in SSA followed an increasing trend until the late 90s in which the trend was reversed. 
During the period of increasing inflow of SDA, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita was also increasing but at a very slow rate as indicated in figure 1. The graph also 
illustrates that during the period 1983 to 1999 in which SDA per capita was increasing 
rapidly, GDP per capita or economic growth failed to respond to SDA growth. In fact 
economic growth remained stable in most years, with unpronounced positive and 
negative growth rates in some years. The African Development Bank’s annual report 
(2004) reports that over 30% of the financial SDA to SSA in the 1980s and early 90s 
were allocated to countries with instability like Mozambique, Rwanda, Angola, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, among others. The SDA was basically for humanitarian issues and failed to 
address investment issues in both output production and environmental technologies.  
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Despite the increasing total greenhouse gases emissions in SSA, figure 1 indicates that 
per capita emissions almost remained stable from 1970 to 2000. The reasons could be 
that:  
• The increasing SDA inflow might have been used to avoid emissions from further 
increases 
• SSA population could have been growing rapidly to reduce per capita emissions 
• Production could have been so low in the region 
A more formal derivation of the relationship between financial SDA per capita and 
greenhouse gases emissions per capita is applied in the succeeding chapters (see chapters 
3 and 4). 
 
Figure 1 
SSA Trends in Financial SDA, Greenhouse Gases Emission, Energy Use and GDP  
 
Financial SDA per capita and GDP per capita ( gdppcap)  are in 00s  US$, Greenhouse gases  emissions 
per capita  (ghgpcap)  in  metric tons and Energy use per capita (enupcap)  in 00s kgs of oil equivalent. 
Source: The WBDIS data. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Economic growth is highly linked with increasing emissions of greenhouse gases. In 
developing countries, rapid economic growth is not an option but a need because of the 
starving populations. It is against this background that though every individual country 
should have an input in the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions through sustainable 
economic development, developing countries have scarce resources to pay for 
environmental air quality improvements. In other words, developing countries have a 
very low WTP for environmental air quality improvements. A holistic approach in which 
the rich compensate the poor for emissions reduction is therefore a prerequisite for the 
global fight against greenhouse gas emissions. Developed countries have since been 
providing sustainable development assistance to developing countries for the purpose of 
achieving sustainable development. However, the question is, “Does the assistance 
effectively influence environmental air quality in poor countries?” 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The study seeks to empirically examine the contribution of sustainable development 
assistance given to developing countries in improving environmental air quality. Since in 
this study, greenhouse gases emissions are used as a measure of environmental air 
quality, the study specifically investigates how the financial sustainable development 
assistance given to SSA has influenced its emissions over the period under study. The 
main questions of the study are:  
• Does financial SDA influence greenhouse gases emissions in SSA region? 
• For a unit change in the amount of financial SDA embodied in a unit of output, by 
how much will the proportion of green housegases embodied in a unit of output 
change? 
 It also investigates the impact of energy use intensity, per capita income and 
manufacturing share on greenhouse gases emissions in SSA. 
 
1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
The study is carried out during the period in which the world is trying to find solutions to 
the unsustainably rising levels of greenhouse gases emissions. In December 2007, over 
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180 countries met in Bali, Indonesia for a UN conference on global greenhouse-gas 
pollution. During this conference European countries called for the UN to set a goal of 
halving greenhouse-gas pollution by 2050. In addition to the urgent attention given to 
these emissions, developing countries have experienced an increased inflow of financial 
assistance for sustainable development from developed countries, particularly from 
European countries, the United States, the UN and Japan. It is against this background 
that every country should have the responsibility of improving the marginal benefit of 
financing sustainable development. It is important that every marginal unit of the SDA 
received by developing countries be used effectively in economic growth without 
compromising environmental air quality. The study seeks to explain whether financial 
SDA effectively alters greenhouse gases emissions in SSA countries. This will in turn 
provide some hints on the need to find better methods of financing sustainable 
development.  
 
1.5 HYPOTHESES  
The theoretical basis of this study is that in the absence of compensation from rich 
countries, poor countries devote insignificant resources to control greenhouse gases 
emissions because their WTP for environmental air quality improvements is very low. On 
the other hand, in the presence of compensation for their loss of output (the opportunity 
cost of environmental air quality improvements), they will devote significant resources to 
environmental quality. But because of the absence of perfect monitoring, it is assumed 
that the compensation given in the form of financial assistance such as SDA can only 
influence emissions weakly in these countries due to moral hazard problems. So the study 
tests the assertion that financial SDA negatively and weakly explains the variability of 
greenhouse gases emissions in developing countries. In addition, it also tests the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between greenhouse gases emissions and the other 
explanatory variables, which include energy use intensity, per capita income, 
manufacturing share and the lagged variables of financial SDA and per capita income. 
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1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study covers a sample of 28 SSA countries over a 31-year period from 1970 to 2000. 
The study considers only countries without missing data over the study period. The two 
dimensional model (time dimension and cross sectional or country dimension) calls for 
the use of panel data econometrics methodology. By applying this methodology, the 
study seeks to explain the effect of financial SDA on air quality variability across SSA 
countries over time. It focuses on whether financial SDA influences environmental air 
quality in SSA countries and not on the causes of the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of 
SDA. 
 
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER 
The rest of the work is organized as follows: Chapter two presents literature review. 
Chapter three covers theoretical framework and methodology. Model estimation and 
analysis of results are presented in chapter four. Finally, chapter five concludes and gives 
some policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of SDA have been mainly carried out by the World 
Bank, scholars and some of the assistance providers like Japan, Western Europe and the 
United States. These studies mainly concentrate on the relationship between economic 
growth and SDA. They are commonly deprived of the impact of SDA on the 
environment; what this study seeks to address.  
 
Dollar and Pritchett (1998) argue that the World Bank’s 1998 release of Assessing Aid 
represents a landmark attempt to quantitatively study what makes aid effective. Mounting 
criticisms of foreign aid from the public and private sectors set the stage for the release of 
Assessing Aid. The report has a heavy focus on empirical evidence that lends a scientific 
credibility to the work. The report uses regression models that incorporate policy, 
economic, and institutional index scores derived from empirical data on aid programs in 
56 developing countries during 1970-93. These models form a useful and detailed 
analytical framework designed to isolate the factors that contribute to the success or 
failure of aid initiatives. The results are used to develop a series of conclusions about why 
aid works in some situations and not in others. Corruption has been found to be a critical 
factor in the failure of multiple aid programs. The report generated the following central 
finding: Aid does the most to support economic growth and reduce poverty when local 
governments practice “good management” of social, environmental, political, and 
economic institutions. The report’s conclusions are: 
• “Improvements in economic institutions and policies in the developing world are 
the key to a quantum leap in poverty reduction.”  
• “Effective foreign aid is a natural compliment to private investments.”  
• “Sector specific development projects are often fungible, but they can serve to 
strengthen local institutions and policies across sectors.”  
• “Projects that involve local “ownership” and social investments are most 
effective.” 
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• “Aid can work even in poor policy environments if donors focus on sharing of 
knowledge and technical capacity rather than money.”  
 
The World Bank report also concludes that high corruption levels in developing countries 
makes financial (monetary) assistance ineffective. The better option for aid could 
therefore be the sharing of knowledge and technical capacity.  
 
In 2006 the World Bank assessed the effectiveness of World Bank Group Assistance 
(WBGA) for the environment as reported in the World Bank Development Report 
(2006). The environment has become central to the international development agenda 
over the past three decades, including that of the World Bank Group (hereafter “the Bank 
Group” or WBG). This began with the first United Nations Conference on the 
environment held in Stockholm in 1972, after which countries throughout the world 
began to give increasing attention to environmental concerns. Around the same time, the 
World Bank appointed its first environmental specialists. As part of its 1987 
reorganization, the Bank established a central Environment Department and Environment 
Divisions in each of its four (later six) operational Regions. It also set mandatory 
procedures for screening, assessing and managing all new investment operations for their 
environmental (and social) effects, as did the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and 
(once established in1989) the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In the 
early 1990s, any developing countries – particularly those eligible for financing from the 
International Development Association (IDA) elaborated National Environmental Action 
Plans (NEAPs), and the Bank (including IDA) began to step up lending for 
environmental improvement, often to support implementation of these plans. 
 
The 2006 assessment and evaluation of the WBGA were largely based on country case 
studies. The assessment was on a full range of WBG support involving the environment 
and its effectiveness over the past decade and a half. China, India and Brazil, the most 
significant Bank Group clients in terms of their global environmental importance were 
given first priority as case studies. In Africa the evaluation focused on four countries 
(Ghana, Madagascar, Senegal and Uganda). In addition, two more countries considered 
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being globally and regionally significant (Russian Federation and Egypt) were also 
considered as case studies. In Brazil WBGA was found to be effective in forestry 
conservation. In the African countries and China the WBG financial assistance 
insignificantly improved environmental quality whereas the non-financial assistance had 
a positive impact on environmental quality. 
 
Grossman and Krueger (1993) investigate the reduced-form relationship between per 
capita incomes and various environmental quality indicators, urban air pollution, oxygen 
regime in river basins, fecal contamination of river basins, and contamination of river 
basins by heavy metals. They apply the random effects estimation procedure using the 
linear, quadratic and cubic functional forms and the findings are: 
• Urban air pollution rise with per capita GDP at per capita income levels below 
US$10 000 at constant 1990 US$. All income variables are significant at the 1% 
level but lagged variables are more significant. 
• Dissolved oxygen in rivers rise with per capita GDP at income levels below 
US$7500 but falls when this income threshold is exceeded. Income variables are 
jointly significant at the 1% level. 
• Increases in per capita GDP are associated with roughly constant levels of fecal 
contamination until a country reaches a real per capita income level of US$8000. 
Thereafter, fecal contamination falls with income. 
In their sample, Grossman and Krueger find that the cubic functional form provides the 
best fit for countries with per capita incomes in excess of US$16 000. In their sample of 
North American countries only Canada and the United States of America exceeded this 
income threshold. The quadratic functional form also provides the best fit for countries 
with per capita incomes in excess of US$8 000. They generally find no evidence that 
environmental quality steadily deteriorates with economic growth. 
 
Shafik (1994) estimates three functional forms of panel regression of environmental 
quality on per capita income, endowment such as climate, technology, and social 
decisions policies for 149 countries over the period 1960 to1990. The results indicate that 
environmental indicators such as water quality and urban sanitation improve with higher 
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per capita incomes whereas air pollution such as carbon emissions worsens with higher 
per capita incomes, during the initial phases of economic development. His log-linear 
specification provides the explanatory power with significant quadratic and cubic terms. 
The turning point on the quadratic specification occurs at per capita income levels well 
above US$10 000. Shafik reaches the same conclusion with Grossman and Krueger that 
the quadratic and cubic functional forms provide the best fits for countries with per capita 
real incomes well above US$10 000. Seldon and Song (1992) also find evidence that 
quadratic and cubic functional forms provide excellent fit for data related to developed 
countries, that is, to high per capita income countries. 
 
Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) examine aid effectiveness in developing countries. 
Based on the cross country regressions by Rajan and Subramanian (2005), Easterly et al 
(2003) and Clemens et al (2004), Bourguignon and Sundberg conclude that the 
relationship between aid and development outcomes is fragile and often ambiguous. Aid 
has often been for non-developmental objectives, such as disaster relief or for military 
and political ends. Much aid is lost due to instability and conflict: roughly half of aid to 
Sub-Saharan Africa has gone to countries facing civil war and/or frequent military coups 
(Fitzpatrick et al, 2007).  By analyzing ninety-seven different studies on the impact of aid 
on growth, drawing on three different approaches used in the literature, they conclude 
that at best there appears to be a small positive, but insignificant, impact of aid on 
growth. 
 
Najam (2002) analyzes the UN Summit on Financing for Development (FfD), whose 
main goal is output growth in the third world countries and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD), which put more emphasis on environmental quality 
than on output growth. For developing countries in particular and for all those concerned 
with issues of international development, the substance of these summits and the fact that 
they come back-to-back is of considerable significance. Arnold points out that developing 
countries preferred FfD to its successor WSSD which has more emphasis on 
environmental quality. 
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Burnside and Dollar (2000) found out that when other determinants of growth are 
controlled for, especially an indicator of economic policy, aid has no effect on growth. 
Aid only makes a positive contribution to growth in those countries with high values for 
the policy indicator; if policy is poor, aid is ineffective. After using essentially the same 
data for the same sample, but with different specifications and estimators, Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) argue that aid does have a positive effect on growth and this result is not 
conditional on policy. 
 
The mechanism on how aid is transmitted into economic growth in SSA countries is 
discussed in Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2002)’s Aid and Growth: Accounting for 
Transmission Mechanism in SSA. They identify investment as the most significant 
transmission mechanism, and also consider effects of aid on growth via government 
spending and imports. With the use of residual generated regressors, they achieve a 
measure of the total effect of aid on growth, accounting for the effect via investment (see 
figure 2). A pooled panel results for a sample of 34 SSA countries over the period 1970 
to 1997 point to a highly significant positive effect of foreign aid on growth. On average, 
a percentage point increase in aid-GDP ratio adds one third of a percentage point to the 
growth rate.  
 
The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)’s working paper No. 11 
examines how diverging interests among the stakeholders, the donor, the developing 
country government and its people might cause non-optimal allocation of SDA.  In the 
working paper, O’Brien and Ryan (2001) reports that, “Kenya continued to violate its 
agreements with donors on grain marketing because those in charge of the state benefited 
from such an arrangement. The response of donors to government’s pattern of one step 
forward, three steps back, sometimes deliberately ignored the point that the problem was 
political, related to protecting the vested interests of key actors, and not technical.” 
Governments might thrive to satisfy their own utility at the expense of country utility 
thereby making the aid inefficient. Under such circumstances, Putman (1993) argues that 
increasing the number of non-state actors would improve the efficiency of aid. Putman’s 
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1993 study in Italy found a statistically significant relationship between the growth of 
non-state organizations (NGOs) and developmental effectiveness. 
 
DESA also explains that donors might also cause inefficiency in the allocation of aid by 
having interests that diverge from developing countries’ interests. According to the 
DESA working paper No. 11, in Uganda donors assisted local groups to develop 
organizations to protect the environment in an area where hills were virtually denudated. 
These hills were of marginal interest to community members because their livelihood was 
mostly off-farm and did not stem from toiling their land. Hence they did not have much 
incentive to put their labour into environmental protection. 
 
Empirical literature discussed in this chapter shows that most of the empirical studies on 
the efficacy of development assistance put more emphasis on the aid’s impact on 
economic growth, social and political institutional development. The general consensus 
in these studies’ conclusions is that financial aid is less effective for sustainable 
development in countries with poor macroeconomic policies and high levels of 
corruption whereas non-financial assistance such as knowledge and technology sharing 
prove to be effective irrespective of the country’s corruption levels.  
 
The word “sustainable” appears in almost every study but surprisingly the studies seem to 
give little attention to the environment. In other words the empirical studies deprive the 
word “sustainable development”2 of the environmental weight it deserves. It is from this 
background that the idea of this study to examine the impact of financial SDA on 
environmental quality was generated.   
 
Basing on Gomanee et al’s argument on how aid is transmitted into growth, this study 
assumes that SDA can also be transmitted into environmental quality improvement 
through the same mechanism. This mechanism is based on the Harrod-Domar model of 
growth which says that developing countries have very low savings rates which makes it 
difficult for these countries to accumulate capital. So with additional income from 
                                                 
2 Sustainable development is the development that does not compromise the ability of future generations to 
meet their needs. 
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sustainable development assistance, they can raise their saving thereby increasing 
investment, which in turn influences economic growth and environmental quality. Figure 
2 illustrates this transmission mechanism.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Transmission Mechanisms for Aid to Growth/ Environmental Quality 
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Source: Aid and Growth: Accounting for transmission mechanisms in 
SSA countries by Gomanee et al (2002) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Little has been said about the applicability of classical models in explaining the impact of 
financial sustainable development assistance on environmental quality in poor countries. 
There is wide agreement about the need for developed countries to assist developing 
countries with financial resources for the purpose of achieving the world‘s developmental 
goal of sustainability. There is however least agreement on whether the financial 
assistance is effectively used by developing countries or whether the assistance is 
effectively provided by the developed countries. What does economic theory say about 
this? 
 
In this chapter, the linkage between economic theory and this study will be discussed. 
Two different theoretical frameworks will be considered in this section. The first part, 
3.1.1, discusses the linkage between this study and the consumer theory of utility 
maximization whilst section 3.1.2 discusses the transmission mechanism of sustainable 
development assistance to environmental quality and growth with clean-up expenditures.  
 
3.1.1 The Theory of Utility Maximization 
This section utilizes microeconomics theory to advance the economic theoretical basis of 
financial assistance given to developing countries by developed countries for sustainable 
development. The basic tool of analysis in this paper is the consumer theory of utility 
maximization. When developing countries receive financial SDA from developed 
countries they respond by attempting to maximize their utility subject to their resource 
base. However, the question is: “how do these countries allocate the financial SDA to 
maximize their utility?” They can either finance environmental air quality improvements 
activities, output growth activities or both. The objective of developed countries giving 
sustainable development financial assistance to these countries is to finance activities that 
improve developing countries’ output without harming the environmental quality (Q ). 
However, outcome expectations from developed countries might be higher than the 
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optimal outcomes for environmental air quality in developing countries. This is explained 
by the low level of WTP for improvements in environmental air quality in poor countries. 
It is assumed that the indifference curves for poor countries are biased towards output 
growth whereas those of developed countries are biased towards environmental quality. 
In most low income countries like in SSA countries, governments strive to feed the 
majority poor population, a situation which could force these governments to use the 
cheapest means of production in order to provide affordable products to this group whose 
WTP for environmental air quality is very low. In the event that the government’s utility 
is more biased towards output growth than the country’s utility, the environmental quality 
and output outcomes from financial SDA might also be non-optimal.  The inefficiency of 
financial SDA in developing countries might therefore be a result of: 
• Developed countries demanding higher than optimal environmental quality 
outcomes from developing countries.  
• Abuse of financial SDA by developing countries’ governments which might be 
seeking to satisfy government utility at the expense of country utility.  
 
The abuse of financial SDA is mainly a result of moral hazard problem. Governments of 
developing countries can only abuse the assistance in situations where the providers of 
the assistance cannot monitor the actions of the assistance-receivers. Gyimah-Brempong 
and Traynor (1999) argue that most low income countries like those in SSA, the political 
goal tends to override the goal of sustainable development. Governments of these 
countries strive to attract support from the majority of the population who are poor by 
trying to use the cheapest means of production in order to provide affordable products. So 
the financial sustainable development assistance received by these countries might be 
used to produce cheap output at whatever cost to the environment irrespective of the 
assistance’s goal of sustainability in development. 
 
The Optimal Choice 
Developing countries derive utility from environmental quality (Q ) and output (Y ), that 
is, U = U (Q ,Y ). It is assumed that this utility function is continuous, increasing and 
concave in both Q  and Y , that is: 
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Each country thrives to achieve the highest possible level of utility but it is constrained 
by its resource availability, W . It therefore faces the following problem: 
YQ,max U = U (Q ,Y ) ts.  WYpQp YQ ≤+ , 
 where Qp  is the per unit cost of environmental quality improvement and Yp  is the per 
unit cost of output production. The Lagrange multiplier is used to solve this problem of 
static optimization and utility is maximized when the Marginal Rate of Substitution 
(MRS)3 between Q  and Y is equal to the price ratio of the two commodities. Figure 3.1.1 
(a) illustrates the optimal condition as discussed in microeconomic literature (Varian, 
1992). From this diagram *Q  and *Y  are the respective environmental quality and output 
levels that maximize utility. However, these levels are very low in developing countries 
to the extent that some of these economies are characterized by very low per capita 
income and starving populations. Poverty levels are very high, which make governments 
of these countries thrive for output growth at the expense of environmental quality 
improvement. It is against this background that this paper assumes that in poor third 
world countries, with more emphasis put on the African continent, first priority is given 
to output growth at the expense of environmental quality improvements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The Marginal Rate of Substitution, which is the slope of the indifference curve, measures the opportunity 
cost of consuming one more unit of a commodity, that is, it gives the number of units of commodity A (say 
Y) that should be given up in order to have one unit of commodity B (say Q). 
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Figure 3.1.1 (a) 
The Optimal Choice 
 
 
The financial assistance given to these poor countries by rich countries for sustainable 
development modifies the optimal choice of consumption through changes in the 
country’s budget constraint. Such modifications are demonstrated in the succeeding 
sections.  
 
Utility Maximization in the Presence of Financial SDA: A Model of Pre-Cure 
Environmental Financial Assistance 
Pre-cure is hereby defined as “before putting any effort in environmental improvement or 
treatment”. The financial assistance given to developing countries to finance activities 
that improve environmental quality before these countries take any action is therefore 
referred to as pre-cure assistance. When developing countries receive this financial 
assistance from rich countries, they can either finance environmental quality 
improvement activities, output growth activities or both. The financial SDA which is 
mostly provided as lump sum shifts the country’s budget line to a higher level and 
establishes a new resource constraint parallel to the one illustrated in figure 3.1.1 (a). The 
Q  
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0U  
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WYpQp YQ =+
1O  
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assistance will therefore increase the country’s budget thereby making higher 
environmental quality and output production affordable, giving higher optimal values of 
Q  and Y . Figure 3.1.1 (b) illustrates how financial SDA shifts the resource constraint in 
developing countries. 
 
Figure 3.1.1 (b) 
The establishment of a new optimal level 
 
A lump sum financial SDA, S , shifts the country’s budget constraint from 
WYpQp YQ =+  to a higher level budget , SWYpQp YQ +=+ . The developing country 
will therefore move to a higher optimal point, 2O , with higher levels of environmental 
quality, **Q , and output, **Y , from a lower optimal point, 1O , as illustrated in figure 
3.1.1 (b). It is also shown that the financial SDA makes it possible for the developing 
country to shift from a low utility indifference curve, 0U , to a higher utility indifference 
curve, 1U .  
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Financial SDA improves the utility of a developing country via a parallel upward shift of the 
budget constraint. 
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Since developed countries are assumed to have indifference curves biased towards 
environmental quality such as DvpdU  illustrated in figure 3.1.1 (c), their expectations 
about the outcome of environmental air quality from the financial SDA, sometimes 
exceed the optimal of a poor country, that is, sometimes exceed **Q . In the absence of 
information asymmetry and rigidities in enforcement, SDA providers can monitor and 
control the use of the funds. In the event that their demands for environmental air quality 
exceed **Q  such as DvpdQ , with no enforcement rigidities and no information asymmetry, 
financial SDA can also be inefficient in developing countries. 
 
Figure 3.1.1 (c) 
Non-optimal environmental quality and output levels 
 
 
Q  
Y0 *Y  
*Q  
0U  
GvtY
WYpQp YQ =+
1U
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In the absence of information asymmetry and rigidities in enforcement, high demands for 
environmental quality by SDA providers may sometimes render the assistance inefficient in 
developing countries. On the other hand, in the presence of moral hazard, governments of 
poor countries may put too much weight on output growth rendering the assistance 
inefficient as well.
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A high demand for environmental quality outcome by developed countries from SDA 
such as DvpdQ  in figure 3.1.1 (c) implies a movement by the developing country from the 
optimal SDA allocation,  2O , to a non-optimal point, 
DvpdO , with lower than optimal 
output DvpdY  but higher than optimal environmental quality, DvpdQ . This is however 
possible under perfect monitoring and perfect enforcement mechanisms, the necessary 
conditions that enable providers of financial SDA force developing countries to produce 
at their optimal consumption levels, which  sometimes have higher environmental quality 
levels than the developing countries’ own optimal as illustrated in figure 3.1.1 (c). 
 
Despite the creation of institutions to monitor the funds, perfect information is never 
achievable. The presence of moral hazard sometimes makes pre-cure financial assistance 
in environmental management ineffective in developing countries. Since developing 
countries prioritize output growth at the expense of environmental quality, in the absence 
of an effective monitoring system by the assistance providers, governments of these 
countries may give too much weight on output growth thereby producing more than 
optimal output and less than optimal environmental quality. For example, figure 3.1.1 (c)      
indicates that if the government’s utility, GvtU , is more biased towards output growth than 
the country’s utility, 1U , then the country normally consumes at a lower and inefficient 
indifference curve. Consider also the situation in figure 3.1.1 (c) where the government 
chooses allocation GvtO  with larger than optimal output, GvtY ,  and  less than optimal 
environmental quality, GvtQ , to satisfy its own utility, GvtU ,  the country will consume at 
a lower and inefficient indifference curve, IneffU .   
 
Under extreme cases in which governments of developing countries derive insignificant 
utility from environmental air quality improvements, inefficient allocation might be 
further biased towards output growth to the extent that environmental quality might 
deteriorate to levels lower than the initial levels before the financial SDA. On the other 
hand, if developed countries have utility extremely biased towards high outcomes of 
environmental quality from financial SDA, then with perfect monitoring and no 
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enforcement problems, output in developing countries might deteriorate to levels lower 
than those before financial SDA.  Figure 3.1.1 (d) illustrates the two extreme cases. 
 
Figure 3.1.1 (d) 
An extreme case of non-optimal allocation 
 
Figure 3.1.1 (d) indicates that an allocation DvpdO  is associated with very high 
environmental quality, DvpdQ , but very small output, DvpdY , smaller than the initial output, 
*Y , before financial SDA. This is not conducive for developing countries whose output 
levels are still not enough to feed their starving populations. The other extreme allocation 
is at point GvtO , where the government of a developing country gives extreme weight on 
output production. At this allocation point, the output size, GvtY , is very large but the 
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Extremely inefficient allocations, ODvpd and OGvt. The two allocations are worse than the 
optimal with financial SDA. 
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environmental quality has decreased from the initial level without financial SDA, *Q , to 
a lower level, GvtQ . However, extreme allocations as illustrated in figure 3.1.1 (d) are 
more unlikely. 
 
It is therefore indicated in this section that the inefficiency of financial SDA may be a 
result of either that the assistance providers, with perfect information and no enforcement 
problems, demand greater than optimal environmental quality outcomes from poor 
countries or that under moral hazard, governments of developing countries put greater 
than optimal weight on output production. Following this theoretical framework, the 
study assumes the presence of moral hazard and rigidities in enforcement by financial 
SDA providers. So the study assumes that the significant weight of inefficiency comes 
from the distortions caused by government allocations in developing countries.  
 
3.1.2 Financial SDA in a Static Model with Clean-up Expenditure 
The static model explains how economic activities are linked to the quality of the 
environment. It explains how economies divide income from production, Y , into 
consumption, C , and clean-up expenditures, X ,  and how waste from production and 
consumption affects the environment. This study attempts to fit in financial SDA in this 
theoretical model framework. Figure 3.1.2 summarizes the static model with clean-up 
expenditures.  
 
In this study, it is assumed that financial SDA is provided as a lump sum thereby adding 
to the total resources of a country to give its total income or output, SDAYYSDA += . Let 
the consumption after financial SDA be SDAC  and the country’s clean-up expenditure 
after financial SDA be SDAX , then by introducing financial SDA as lump sum, the 
developing country’s national income expands from XCY +=  to  
(3.1.2.1) SDASDASDA XCY +=  
 In figure 3.1.2, environmental quality is a function of national income, Y , and clean-up 
expenditures, X , that is, ),( XYQQ = . But with financial SDA the environmental 
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quality will be a function of financial SDA-related national income and financial SDA-
related clean-up expenditures, that is,  
(3.1.2.2) ),( SDASDA XYQQ =  
A total differentiation of (3.1.2.1) gives 
(3.1.2.3) SDASDASDA dXdCdY +=  and that of (3.1.2.2) gives 
(3.1.2.4) SDAXSDASDAYSDA dXQdYQdQ +=  
        = SDAXSDASDASDAYSDA dXQdXdCQ ++ )(  (from (3.1.2.3)) 
        = SDAXSDAYSDASDAYSDA dXQQdCQ )( ++ , where YSDAQ  is the change in 
environmental quality resulting from a marginal change in national income with financial 
SDA and XSDAQ  is the change in environmental quality resulting from a marginal change 
in financial SDA-related clean-up expenditures. Alternatively, YSDAQ  can be taken as the 
impact weight of a change in financial SDA-related consumption on environmental 
quality and ( XSDAYSDA QQ + ) is the impact weight of a change in financial SDA-related 
clean-up expenditures on environmental quality. It is expected that an increase in national 
output/income reduces environmental quality, that is, YSDAQ < 0 and an increase in clean-
up expenditures increases environmental quality, that is, XSDAQ > 0. From (3.1.2.4), the 
term SDAYSDA dCQ  is negative, that is, SDAYSDA dCQ <0, since YSDAQ < 0 and SDAdC >0 and 
SDAdX  > 0. Therefore, a necessary but not sufficient condition for  dQ  to be positive is 
that YSDAQ < XSDAQ , that is, the environment must be more responsive to SDA-related 
clean-up processes than to SDA-related production waste accumulation, and the 
sufficient condition is ( SDAYSDASDAXSDAYSDA dCQdXQQ −>+ ) . The inequality illustrates 
that if financial SDA increases clean-up expenditures by more than the increase in 
consumption then environmental quality will improve, that is, in addition to the necessary 
condition, the conditions SDAdX  > SDAdC  and XSDAYSDA QQ +  > YSDAQ  improve Q . In 
other words, financial SDA improves environmental quality if clean-up expenditure is 
more responsive to national income changes than consumption. 
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If it is assumed that financial SDA enters the production process as financial capital input 
(the accounting capital definition), then the production function in figure 3.1.2 is 
expressed as: 
(3.1.2.5) ),,,( SDATLKYY = , 
where SDAandTLK ,,  are physical capital, labour, technology and financial capital, 
respectively. A total differential of the production function gives 
(3.1.2.6) dSDAYdTYdLYdKYdY SDATLK +++=  ,  where Z
YYz ∂
∂=  for any Z. 
The environmental quality is a function of output,Y , and clean-up expenditures, X , that 
is, 
(3.1.2.7) ),( XYQQ =  
Differentiating this function gives 
(3.1.2.8) dXQdYQdQ XY +=  
        = dXQdSDAYdTYdLYdKYQ XSDATLKY ++++ )(  (from (3.1.2.6)) 
        = dXQdSDAYQdTYQdLYQdKYQ XSDAYTYLYKY ++++    
Holding all other factors of production constant, we obtain the partial derivative of the 
environmental quality with respect to financial SDA as 
(3.1.2.9)  SDAYYQdSDA
dQ =  (< 0), where 
Y
QQY ∂
∂=  (<0) and 
SDA
YYSDA ∂
∂=  (> 0) 
So in cases where developing countries use financial SDA as financial capital input in 
production, the environmental quality might deteriorate due to increased output growth. 
In this case financial SDA reduces environmental quality. 
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Figure 3.1.2  
The Impact of Economic Processes on Environmental Quality 
 
Source: Environmental economics literature 
 
 
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
The study makes use of panel data econometrics to examine the efficacy of financial 
development assistance in managing greenhouse gases emissions in SSA countries. The 
choice of this method is based on the weight of its advantages relative to pure time series 
and pure cross-sectional data procedures. Greenhouse gases emissions and Sustainable 
Development Assistance (SDA) vary across the SSA countries and also over time. 
Countries in the region exhibit individual-specific variables such as policies, managerial 
capabilities, corruption levels, among others and period-specific variables such as 
economic depressions and booms may not be ruled out. Such individual-specific and 
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period-specific variables require the use of panel data. Pure cross-sectional data contain 
no information on period-specific variables or on the effect of period-specific variables 
and on the other hand, pure time series data contain no information on individual 
differences or on effects of individual-specific variables. Panel data make it possible to 
circumvent this problem while at the same time control for individual-specific and time-
specific heterogeneity. A detailed discussion on the advantages of panel data can be 
found in Baltagi (1995), Hsiao (1986), Bailer (1989), Kasprzyk et al (1989), and Biørn 
(2007), among others. 
 
Following the suggested theoretical relationship between SDA and greenhouse gases 
emissions, SDA and economic growth and the previous studies on the determinants of air 
quality by Shafik, Seldom and Song, and Grossman and Krueger as discussed in chapters 
two and three, this study considers three functional forms in SSA countries; the linear, the 
quadratic and the cubic models.  
 
3.2.1 The Empirical Model 
The empirical model is derived from the theoretical framework in section 3.1 and it is 
defined as:  
(3.2.1.1) 
itGHGEMPGDP  = f ),,,,( ititititit GDPPCAPMANSHAREENUSEPGDPSDAPGDP ε , 
where itGHGEMPGDP  is the amount of greenhouse gases emissions embodied in a unit 
of GDP for country i  in period t , itSDAPGDP  is the amount of sustainable development 
assistance embodied in a unit of GDP for country i  in period t , itENUSEPGDP  is a 
measure  of the intensity of energy use per unit of output for country i  in period t , 
itMANSHARE  is the share of manufacturing for country i  in period t  and itGDPPCAP  is 
per capita income for country i  in period t . The variables are in terms of per unit of 
output for easier comparisons across countries and over time. The GDP for every country 
in the study is expressed in US$ at 2000 constant prices. The variables abbreviations are 
defined in table 3.2.1 below. 
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Table 3.2.1 
Definition of Variable Abbreviations 
itGHGEMPGDP  Greenhouse Gases Emissions per unit of output 
itSDAPGDP  Sustainable Development Assistance per unit of output 
itENUSEPGDP  Energy Use as output share 
itMANSHARE  Manufacturing Share 
itGDPPCAP  Gross Domestic Product (national output) per capita 
 
It is also assumed that there is a time lag between the time Sustainable Development 
Assistance (SDA) is received and the desired outcomes. This study considers the effect of 
SDA received in the previous two years on the current green house gases emissions. In 
addition, the lagged variables of income are also considered since previous income levels 
might have an impact on the nation’s budget for current clean-up expenditures, its current 
fleet of automobiles (carbon emitters), and its current state of technology . The model 
(3.2.1.1) will therefore include the two lagged variables of itSDAPGDP  and those of 
itGDPPCAP . Hence it can be expressed as: 
)2.1.2.3(
 it
GHGEMPGDP
 
=
 
*
iη  +  
)1()1( ×× KK
Zit β + itε , where itZ  is a K×1 row 
vector of all the explanatory and pre-determined variables, that is, 
,,,,, 1−itititititit SDAPGDPGDPPCAPMANSHAREENUSEPGDPSDAPGDPcontainsZ
2−itSDAPGDP , 21 , −− itit GDPPCAPandGDPPCAP . All the variables in itZ  are assumed to 
be exogenous in this model.  itε  is the random error term that satisfies, itε  ~ ),0( 2σIID . 
Both itZ  and itε  are assumed to be independently distributed for all i  and t . 
[ ]/21 .... Kββββ =  is the 1×K  column vector of slope coefficients and *iη  is 
a constant specific to individual i .  
 
Despite the fact that some of the countries in SSA region like Mozambique and Angola 
have been in civil wars in the 1980s, they continued to receive sustainable development 
assistance. The WBDIS of 2007 indicates that every country in the SSA region received 
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SDA at least once between 1970 and 2000 irrespective of its policy rating, corruption 
level and other issues such as political stability. In addition to this, the World Bank 
(2001) reports that lack of determinants for the size of sustainable development assistance 
to be provided to a given developing country by developed countries might cause the 
assistance to be ineffective. The absence of conditionality placed on SDA by donors 
provides an insight of ruling out the presence of a reverse causality or simultaneity bias 
between greenhouse gases emissions and financial SDA in SSA region from 1970 to 
2000.    
 
The study also considers a situation in which the previous period greenhouse gases 
emissions influence the current period emissions. It is assumed that the accumulation of 
previous emissions in the current period might increase the current emissions due to the 
deprivation of the current clean-up expenditure of its income share, which will be allotted 
to previous emissions clean-up. In this case a dynamic panel data model is considered. 
The model, which includes the lagged variable of the dependent variable, 
1−itGHGEMPGDP ,  is as follows: 
(3.2.1.3) itGHGEMPGDP  = 
*
iη  + 1−itGHGEMPGDP λ  + βitZ  + itε , where the 
variables are as defined in the model (3.2.1.2) except for 1−itGHGEMPGDP  which is non 
exogenous. λ  is the autoregressive coefficient assumed to be less than one in absolute 
value, a standard assumption for stationary AR(1)4 models in pure time series. Applying 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on model (3.2.1.3) gives biased and inconsistent 
estimators since itε  is correlated with 1−itGHGEMPGDP . The within-individual 
estimator of the autoregressive coefficient in this model is inconsistent, with negative 
bias, if N → ∞ and T is finite. It is only consistent if T → ∞ for any N. The estimators of 
the N intercepts *iη  are inconsistent if N → ∞ and T is finite. They are consistent if T → 
∞ for any N. 
 
                                                 
4 AR(1) means autoregressive model of order one, that is, only one lag is considered for the dependent 
variable. 
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To eliminate the fixed individual-specific effects in model (3.2.1.3) and to be assured of 
consistent estimators, the study estimates the model in differenced form by instrumental 
variables5. The lagged levels, 2−itGHGEMPGDP  and 3−itGHGEMPGDP , the itZ  variables  
and the lagged differences 2−Δ itGHGEMPGDP  and 3−Δ itGHGEMPGDP  are potential 
instruments for 1−Δ itGHGEMPGDP  in the following model: 
(3.2.1.4) itGHGEMPGDPΔ  = λ1−Δ itGHGEMPGDP  + itεΔ  
These potential instruments are correlated with 1−Δ itGHGEMPGDP  and uncorrelated 
with itεΔ . This study uses all of these stated potential instruments except 
2−Δ itGHGEMPGDP  which is dropped because of perfect multicollenearity.  A detailed 
discussion on dynamic panel data models can be found in Biørn (2007), Baltagi (2005), 
Hsiao (2003), and Greene (2000), among others. 
 
It is from these panel data functions where two possible models of panel data can emerge. 
These are the fixed effects (FE) model and the random effects (RE) model. The models 
can either have two-way or one-way heterogeneity but this study applies two-way 
heterogeneity models since green house gases emissions vary across SSA countries and 
also over time. There is a possibility of the existence of both period and individual 
heterogeneity. 
The Random Effects or the Fixed Effects Model? 
One of the major problems for an applied researcher in decision making pertains to the 
choice between treating the effect as fixed or as random. Balestra (1992), Baltagi (1995) 
and Maddala (1987), among others propose several guidelines regarding this problem. 
Balestra (1992, p.27) says, “if individual effects are believed to be related to a large 
number of non-observable random causes, then the random interpretation is clearly 
indicated.” In support of this view, Maddala (1987, p.304) argues, “the *iη  measure 
individual-specific effects that we are ignorant about just as the same way that itε  
                                                 
5 Instrumental variables are variables which are correlated with the variables which they serve as 
instruments and are exogenous explanatory variables in the model in which they serve as instruments. A 
detailed discussion on instrumental variables is found in econometric literature (Gujarati, 2003). 
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measure effects for the thi  cross-section unit in the tht  period that we are ignorant about. 
Thus if itε  is treated as a random variable, then there is no reason that *iη  should be not.” 
The random effects model is said to be more appropriate when N individuals are 
randomly drawn from a large population. On the other hand the fixed effects model is an 
appropriate specification if the sample is closed or exhaustive. 
 
Owusu-Gyapong (1986) argues that the within-group estimator fails to estimate time-
invariant effects and it therefore wastes useful information contained in the relations 
among individual means. So the random effects model is more appropriate in cases where 
the researcher has some time-invariant observations. The fixed effects model also known 
as the Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) model suffers from an enormous loss of 
degrees of freedom for panel data sets where N is very large relative to the size of T. It 
therefore gives inconsistent parameters. By comparing within estimator with the Swamy-
Arora Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator, Taylor (1980) proposes that 
the FGLS is more efficient than the LSDV estimator for all but fewest degrees of 
freedom and the variance of the FGLS estimator is never more than 17% above the 
Cramer-Roa lower bound. For the choice of whether to use fixed effects or random 
effects, most studies have however ignored the use of apriori reasons stipulated in this 
section. Instead researchers use the Hausman test to choose between the fixed effects and 
the random effects procedures. This study avoids apriori reasoning by making use of the 
Hausman test in the choice between the fixed effects and random effects models. 
The Hausman Test for Random Effects 
A critical assumption in the random effects model is that E( itit Z,η ) = 0. This is important 
given that the disturbances contain individual invariant effects ( itη ) which are 
unobserved and may be correlated with itZ . If E( itit Z,η ) ≠ 0, then the Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) estimator, GLS
Λβ , becomes biased and inconsistent for β . On the other 
hand, the within transformation will wipe out the iη  and leave the within estimator, 
Within
Λβ , unbiased and consistent for β . Hausman (1978) developed a test based on 
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comparing GLS
Λβ  and Within
Λβ , both of which are consistent under the null hypothesis, 0H : 
),( itit ZCov η = 0, but with different probability limits if 0H  is not true. Within
Λβ  is 
consistent whether 0H  is true or not, while GLS
Λβ  is the best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE), consistent and asymptotically efficient under 0H , but is inconsistent when 0H  
is not true. The Hausman test can be summarized as: 
0H : ),( itit ZCov η = 0 
1H : ),( itit ZCov η ≠ 0 
The test statistic is given by: 
H  = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − ΛΛ
−ΛΛΛΛ
GLSWithinGLSWithinGLSWithin VarVar ββββββ
1/
~ 2Kχ , where K  is 
the dimension of slope vector, β . If H  is significant, that is, if 0H  is rejected, the fixed 
effects model will be more appropriate. Otherwise, the random effects model will be 
more appropriate. This study finds no evidence to reject 0H since H = 7.89 with a p-
value6 of 24.63%. Hence the results confirm that the random effects model is more 
appropriate in modeling the impact of financial SDA on green-house gases emissions in 
SSA countries (see Appendix B (I)). Detailed discussions on the Hausman test are found 
in Hausman (1978), Biørn (2007), Baltagi (2005), Hsiao (2003), and Greene (2000), 
among others. 
The Random Effects Model 
In models with fixed effects, no assumptions are made about individual-specific 
intercepts, *1η , *2η , ..............., *Nη . In the case that the individual-specific effects are 
randomly distributed across units, a random effects model will be more appropriate. The 
regression equation is 
(3.2.1.5)  itGHGEMPGDP  = 
*
iη  + βitZ + itε  
This equation is defined over i = 1,........, N and t  = 1, ............, T. The individual-specific 
intercepts, *iη  satisfy E( *iη ) = k , var( *iη ) = 2ησ , cov( *iη , *jη ) = 0 for ij ≠  and 
                                                 
6 P-value is the minimum boundary probability at which the null hypothesis is rejected 
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Tji ,..,1, = , where k  and 2ησ  are unknown constants. It is also assumed that *iη , itε  and 
all the explanatory variables are independently distributed. By letting iη = *iη - E( *iη ) = 
*
iη - k , we can express the regression equation with stochastic individual-specific effects 
as: 
(3.2.1.6) itGHGEMPGDP  = 
*
iη  + βitZ   + itε  
            = k + βitZ + itε + iη  
                   = k  + βitZ + itu    
                        where    itu  = itε + iη  
                itε ~ ),0( 21, TT IIID σ ,   i = 1,........, N  t  = 1, ............, T  
                iη ~ ),0( 2ησIID  
itu  is a composite or gross disturbance composed of two different error components, 
hence regression models of this type are also referred to as error components models. The 
GLS gives MVLUE estimators if 2ησ  and 2σ  are known. In the event that the two 
variances are not known, the FGLS gives MVLUE estimators. The two estimators have 
an advantage of being weighted averages of the within-group and between-group 
estimators and therefore enable the researcher to extract information from the two 
variations as discussed in Green (2003) and Owusu-Gyapong (1986). 
 
3.2.2 Variable Definition and Justification 
The dependent variable in this study, greenhouse gases emissions per unit of output 
(GHGEMPGDP ), gives the content of greenhouse gases embodied in a unit of output. 
This provides a proxy measure for environmental air quality. itGHGEMPGDP  is 
therefore the amount of greenhouse gases emissions per unit of output in country i  in 
period t  and is measured in metric tons of carbon. The components of greenhouse gases 
include carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane and other gases. By using greenhouse 
gases emissions as the dependent variable makes it difficult to compare the state of the 
environmental quality across countries or over time. It is against this background that this 
study suggests to use GHGEMPGDP  as the dependent variable rather than greenhouse 
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gases emissions.GHGEMPGDP  makes it possible to compare whether the 1990 output 
was cleaner (embodied less emissions of greenhouse gases) than the 2000 output in 
country i  or whether country i ’s output is cleaner (has less content of greenhouse gases 
emissions) than country j ’s. It is also easier to examine the impact of financial 
sustainable development assistance and energy use on the proportion of greenhouse gases 
embodied in output. 
 
The main objective of this study is centered on the impact of financial SDA on 
environmental air quality in SSA countries. There are four explanatory variables in this 
study, namely, Sustainable Development Assistance per unit of output ( SDAPGDP ), 
energy use per unit of output ( ENUSEPGDP ), manufacturing share or the percentage 
value added by manufacturing ( MANSHARE ), the Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDPPCAP ) and four pre-determined variables, the lagged variables of 
SDAPGDP , 1−itSDAPGDP  and 2−itSDAPGDP  and the lagged variables of GDPPCAP , 
1−itGDPPCAP  and 2−itGDPPCAP .  
 
The lagged variables of SDA are included as possible determinants of the variations in 
environmental quality. When developing countries receive the assistance, they do not 
instantaneously use the funds but they require planning time for investment decisions. 
Even if the SDA is instantaneously invested, a time lag between the investment period 
and output production always exists. The existence of such time lags implies that the 
decisions that were made during the previous periods might have an impact on the current 
outcomes. SDA received in the previous periods might have a strong influence on current 
emissions. However, it is not easy to pick the actual memory length for a variable. The 
SDA might have a 10-year memory which calls for several lagged variables but this study 
assumes that SDA has a 2-year memory history. In the case of previous period’s incomes, 
the study proposes to include income lags as possible determinants of air quality  since 
high incomes in the previous period might add up to current clean-up budget or there 
might be a period lag between output production and conversion into green house gases. 
An example might be explained by the importation of automobiles in poor countries, 
characterized by a time lag between the realization of increased income and the increased 
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acquisition of automobiles, which normally takes long because of importation and 
clearance procedures. 
 
itSDAPGDP  is the amount of SDA embodied in every unit of output produced in country 
i  in period t  and is measured in constant 2000 US$ for all countries in the study. The 
use of per unit output SDA deflates the inflated values of SDA thereby making it possible 
to compare variations of SDA across SSA countries. itENUSEPGDP  measures how much 
energy is used per every unit of output in country i  in period t . It is measured in terms 
of kilograms of oil equivalent. The other variables, GDPPCAP  and MANSHARE are per 
capita income and manufacturing share respectively. Manufacturing processes such as 
cement production, coal production, and oil refinery are some of the largest emitters of 
greenhouse gases. Manufacturing in turn plays a major role in the size of a country’s 
GDP, increased manufacturing output increases the overall output of a country. It is 
against this background that the two variables are both considered to be important 
determinants of variations in environmental air quality. GDPPCAP  is measured at 2000 
constant prices in US$ for every country in the study for comparability reasons. 
 
In the dynamic model (3.2.1.3), GHGEMPGDP  is assumed to have memory of its own 
history, that is, it memorizes its previous period values. 1−itGHGEMPGDP  influences the 
current size of emissions because a proportion of the current clean-up expenditure has to 
be used to clean-up the previous period emissions. 
 
3.2.3 Sources of Data 
Data on all variables were collected from secondary sources that include SSA countries’ 
national accounts data, the WBDIS (2007) (www.worldbank.org), the University of 
Oslo’s electronic humanities library (www.ub.uio.no/uhs), Source OECD Statistics 
(new.sourceoecd.org), and Eurostat (epp.eurostat.cec.eu). The sources are found to be 
reliable since the same data collected from these sources show no deviations.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
4.1 STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
On average a unit of output produced in the period between 1970 and 2000 in the 28 SSA 
countries embodied about 0.001082 metric tons of greenhouse gases equivalent to 
0.001082×109 calories of energy, which is less than that of China alone in 1995. The 
2007 WBDIS data show that in 1995 China’s unit of output embodied over 0.00161 
metric tons equivalent to 0.00161×109 calories of energy. The average per capita income 
value of US$678.1853 and the manufacturing share of 10% for SSA countries in the 
period 1970 to 2000 were comparably very low. Over the same period, the US’s average 
per capita income and manufacturing share exceeded US$20000 and 20% respectively. 
Energy use was also comparably low in SSA countries with an average of 1.334160×109 
calories of energy, much below the 1990 European Union average of more than 5×109 
calories of  energy. However, SSA countries received significant sustainable 
development assistance during the period, averaging about US$0.098 in a US$1 unit of 
output. Table 4.1 (a) illustrates the mean, the standard deviation (Std. Dev), the minimum 
(min) and the maximum (max) values of each variable in this study. These values are 
global7 because they are a result of global summations of the variables in question. The 
standard deviation is also global as it is measured as the square root of the squared 
deviations of the variables from their global means. 
 
Variations in GHGEMPGDP, SDAPGDP and GDPPCAP are very huge in the SSA 
region but ENUSEPGDP and MANSHARE exhibit minor variations across the 28 
countries over the study period. 
 
                                                 
7 Global mean = ∑∑
= =
− =
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i
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t
itxNT
x
1 1
1
 and Global Std. Dev =
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xx
N
i
T
t
it∑∑
= =
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
1 1
2
. A detailed discussion 
on global mean and global standard deviation can be obtained in Hsiao (2003). 
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Table 4.1 (a) 
Global summary statistics for N = 28 and T = 31 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 868 0.001082 0.001275 0.00000 0.019059 
SDAPGDP 868 0.098250 0.112849 0.00000 1.272498 
ENUSEPGDP 868 1.334160 0.789478 0.24195 5.048818 
GDPPCAP 868 678.1853 971.1350 56.5200 7714.230 
MANSHARE 868 0.104124 0.052852 0.03000 0.370000 
SDAPGDPt-1 867 0.098336 0.112886 0.00000 1.272498 
SDAPGDPt-2 866 0.098413 0.112928 0.00000 1.272498 
GDPPCAPt-1 867 678.2904 971.6906 56.5200 7714.230 
GDPPCAPt-2 866 678.3300 972.2514 56.5200 7714.230 
 
However, no information for period or country comparisons can be derived from table 
4.1 (a). Statistical summaries of country-specific means ( .ix
−
) and period-specific means 
( tx .
−
) are important to analyze how the study variables have evolved over time and across 
SSA countries. Such useful statistical summaries are illustrated in tables 4.1 (b) and (c). 
 
Table 4.1 (b) shows that the mean value of greenhouse gases emissions embodied in a 
unit of output for SSA countries fell by about 15% from 0.000988 metric tons in 1970 to 
about 0.000837 metric tons in 2000, despite the fact that the region’s emissions were 
comparably low. During the same period, the mean value of financial SDA embodied in a 
unit of output increased from US$0.016 in 1970 to about US$0.085 in 2000. The average 
manufacturing share remained almost constant at 10% whilst the average per capita 
income rose from US$577.8 in 1970 to about US$688.2 in 2000. For more year-specific 
summaries, see an extension of table 4.1 (b) in appendix A. The selection of years is done 
through random sampling of the first year then followed by systematic sampling for the 
rest of the other years in the sample. Figure 4.1 (a) illustrates trends in mean values of 
GHGPGDP, SDAPGDP, ENUSEPGDP, GDPPCAP and MANSHARE for randomly 
selected years.  
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Table 4.1 (b)  
Year-specific summary statistics for N = 31 (Examples: 1970 and 2000) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.000988 0.001057 0.000000 0.004431 
SDAPGDP 28 0.016472 0.014352 0.000000 0.066941 
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.481366 1.067114 0.517739 5.048818 
GDPPCAP 28 577.8057 719.2399 121.6000 3104.000 
 
 
 
1970 
MANSHARE 28 0.096786 0.047380 0.030000 0.230000 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.000837 0.000884 0.000035 0.003329 
SDAPGDP 28 0.085145 0.074453 0.002365 0.255926 
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.317599 0.703436 0.263672 2.967655 
GDPPCAP 28 688.2039 1008.019 96.77000 3876.900 
 
 
 
2000 
MANSHARE 28 0.096428 0.048779 0.030000 0.210000 
 
Figure 4.1 (a) 
Year-specific average trends 
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In figure 4.1 (a), GHGPGDP is expressed in terms of per thousand metric tons of carbon, 
SDAPGDP in tenth US$, ENUSEPGDP in kilograms of oil equivalent, and GDPPCAP in 
thousand US$. The graph shows that GHGEMPGDP remained almost constant in SSA 
region from 1971 to 1996 despite the increasing trend of SDAPGDP in the region. The 
other variables, ENUSEPGDP, GDPPCAP and MANSHARE show minor variations over 
this period. The graph also indicates closer relationships between GHGPGDP and 
ENUSEPGDP, GDPPCAP and MANSHARE than between GHGPGDP and SDAPGDP. 
 
Figure 4.1 (b) 
Scatter plot for year averages of GHGEMPGDP against SDAPGDP 
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Like figure 4.1 (a), the scatter graph for year averages of GHGEMPGDP against year 
averages of SDAPGDP in figure 4.1 (b) indicates that there is no clear relationship 
between greenhouse gases emissions and sustainable development assistance over time. 
The scatter graph illustrates each point (x;y) = (Average SDAPGDP; Average 
GHGEMPGDP) for every year from 1970 to 2000. There is no clearly defined pattern for 
the distribution of years in the scatter, making it difficult to see the nature of the 
relationship between GHGEMPGDP and SDAPGDP over time in SSA countries. 
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Table 4.1 (c)  
Country-specific summary statistics (Examples: Zimbabwe and South Africa) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.003269 0.001067 0.001836 0.004884 
SDAPGDP 31 0.034486 0.029359 0.000015 0.122410 
ENUSEPGDP 31 1.444132 0.118513 1.207407 1.653136 
GDPPCAP 31 620.9355 39.11516 542.0000 690.0000 
MANSHARE 31 0.209677 0.029831 0.160000 0.300000 
SDAPGDPt-1 30 0.041627 0.047779 0.000015 0.245017 
 
 
Zimbabwe 
(co = 28) 
SDAPGDPt-2 29 0.046969 0.055299 0.000015 0.245017 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.003462 0.000344 0.002889 0.003913 
SDAPGDP 31 0.000898 0.001158 0.000000 0.004455 
ENUSEPGDP 31 0.783520 0.100393 0.633892 0.898987 
GDPPCAP 31 3181.742 173.5828 2903.000 3561.000 
MANSHARE 31 0.217419 0.014135 0.190000 0.240000 
SDAPGDPt-1 30 0.003872 0.017154 0.000000 0.095949 
 
 
SA 
(co=23) 
SDAPGDPt-2 29 0.007766 0.027730 0.000000 0.125166 
 
Unlike year-specific summary, the country-specific summary table summarizes the 
variables for a given country like the examples presented in table 4.1 (c). The table shows 
summaries of Zimbabwe and South Africa; randomly picked. By comparing their average 
greenhouse gases emissions, it is shown in the table that over the period 1970 to 2000, 
South Africa’s average greenhouse gases emissions embodied in a unit of output exceeds 
that of Zimbabwe and on average Zimbabwe’s unit of output contains a larger proportion 
of SDA than that of South Africa. For more country-specific summaries, turn to 
extension of table 4.1 (c) in appendix A. The countries are selected through random 
sampling of the first country then followed by systematic sampling-picking every fifth 
country in alphabetical order. 
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In figure 4.1 (c), it is shown that among the randomly selected countries, those with 
larger SDAPGDP have the lowest GHGEMPGDP. Chad and Togo have the largest 
SDAPGDP and the lowest GHGEMPGDP whereas Gabon and Nigeria have the smallest 
SDAPGDP and the highest GHGEMPGDP. Like in figure 4.1 (a), GHGPGDP is 
expressed in terms of per thousand metric tons of carbon, SDAPGDP in tenth US$, 
ENUSEPGDP in kilograms of oil equivalent, and GDPPCAP in thousand US$.  
 
Figure 4.1 (c) 
Country-specific average trends for selected countries 
 
Source: Summary statistics.  
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under-estimated or over-estimated because of the exclusion of the period effect (time 
dimension) and other determinants of greenhouse gases emissions considered in this 
study. Despite this drawback of the turning point, the distribution of countries in the 
scatter graph gives a hint that a quadratic functional form in terms of the SDAPGDP 
variable might provide a good fit for SSA data. 
 
Figure 4.1 (d) 
Scatter plot for country averages of GHGEMPGDP against SDAPGDP. 
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4.2 VARIABLES CORRELATIONS 
Summary statistics such as the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values 
discussed in section 4.1 fail to expose the nature of relationship between two variables. 
This problem can however be circumvented by finding the correlation coefficients which 
define whether two variables are positively, negatively or not correlated. In this section, 
correlations between the study variables are discussed. GHGEMPGDP is negatively 
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correlated with SDAPGDP and the two lagged variables of SDAPGDP but positively 
correlated with ENUSEPGDP, MANSHARE GDPPCAP and the two lagged variables of 
GDPPCAP as illustrated in table 4.2 (a). The correlation coefficient between 
GHGEMPGDP and SDAPGDP has the expected negative sign. Table 4.2 (a) also show 
that the other correlation coefficients have the expected signs, that is, increases in output, 
energy use or manufacturing share are expected to increase greenhouse gases emissions. 
Despite the correctly expected signs, the coefficients indicate weak correlations between 
greenhouse gases emissions embodied in a unit of output and the explanatory variables.  
 
The use of global correlation coefficient ( xyσ )8 makes it impossible to expose the nature 
of correlation between variables in one country or in a specific year. This problem can 
however be circumvented by running country-specific correlations and period-specific 
correlations. Table 4.2 (b) in appendix A illustrates a positive correlation coefficient 
between greenhouse gases emissions embodied in a unit of output and financial SDA 
embodied in a unit of output for Zimbabwe - randomly selected. The coefficient has a 
sign that differs from that of the global coefficient in table 4.2 (a). Table 4.2 (b) gives a 
hint on the fact that it is not in all countries that SDA reduces greenhouse gases 
emissions. The correlation coefficients of all the income variables are negative in 
Zimbabwe. On the other hand, year 2000(randomly selected)-specific correlation 
coefficients have the hypothesis-expected signs for SDAPGDP, GDPPCAP, 
MANSHARE and lagged variables of SDAPGDP and GDPPCAP but an unexpected 
negative sign for energy use as illustrated in table 4.2 (c) in appendix A. It is also 
indicated in table 4.2 (c) that, in year 2000, per capita incomes were positively correlated 
with greenhouse gases emissions in SSA.  
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Table 4.2 (a) 
The global correlation matrix 
 ghgem
pgd
sdapgdp 
enusepgdp 
gdppcap 
m
anshare 
sdapgdp
t-1  
sdapgdp
t-2  
G
dppcap
t-1 
gdppcap
t-2  
ghgem
pgd
 1.0000 
        
sdapgdp 
-0.0851 
 1.0000 
       
enusepgdp 
 0.0222 
 0.2999 
 1.0000 
      
gdppcap 
 0.3153 
-0.3057 
-0.4382 
 1.0000 
     
m
anshare 
 0.2841 
-0.0174 
-0.0178 
 0.0661 
 1.0000 
    
sdapgdp
t-1  
-0.0863 
 0.8515 
 0.2818 
-0.2973 
-0.0320 
1.0000 
   
sdapgdp
t-2  
-0.0858 
 0.7578 
 0.2614 
-0.2879 
-0.0417 
0.8515 
1.0000 
  
gdppcap
t-1  
 0.3033 
-0.3039 
-0.4251 
 0.9637 
 0.0604 
-0.3055 
-0.2971 
1.0000 
 
gdppcap
t-2  
 0.2917 
-0.3003 
-0.4107 
 0.9228 
 0.0524 
-0.3037 
-0.3053 
0.9637 
1.0000 
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4.3 THE RANDOM EFFECTS RESULTS (LINEAR FORM) 
Following the Hausman results presented in chapter three, the study applies the random 
effects model. The random effects coefficients illustrated in Table 4.3 indicate that 
financial SDA reduces greenhouse gases emissions across SSA region. However, the 
results provide no evidence of a significant impact of financial SDA and its lagged values 
on variations in greenhouse gases emissions in SSA. The result compares well with the 
theory of utility maximization with optimal allocation discussed in chapter 3, which 
assumes that poor countries’ indifference curves are biased towards output growth, 
implying that a lump sum increase in the country’s budget is likely to be followed by an 
over-weighted output growth and an under-weighted environmental quality improvement; 
an explicit support to the study hypothesis that SDA weakly reduces greenhouse gases 
emissions in poor countries. Other empirical studies discussed in chapter two also 
generally find no evidence that SDA significantly influence economic development in 
poor countries, though they are quiet on its impact on environmental quality. Based on 
the statistical evidence presented in table 4.3, the study’s hypothesis of a weak positive 
relationship between GHDGEMPGDP  and SDAPGDP  cannot be rejected. 
  
Energy use significantly and positively influences greenhouse gases emissions in SSA 
countries. The results from table 4.3 indicate that a one unit increase in energy use 
increases the share of greenhouse gases emissions embodied in a unit of output by about 
0.04262%. This effect is very large given the almost constant average greenhouse gases 
emissions in SSA countries. The result is expected especially in poor countries like SSA 
countries in which technological growth is very slow leading to low rates of energy 
source substitution. But in countries where technology replaces highly pollutant energy 
sources by less pollutant ones, the coefficient of energy use might take either sign, 
positive or negative.  
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Table 4.3 
The Random Effects Coefficients 
 
GHGEMPGDP       Coef.   Std. Err.      z   P> z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
SDAPGDP -0.0000223 0.000545 -0.04 0.967 -0.001090   0.001046 
ENUSEPGDP  0.0004262 0.000088  4.83 0.000*** 0.000253    0.000599 
GDPPCAP  3.60e-07 1.50e-07  2.39 0.017** 6.50e-08     6.54e-07 
MANSHARE  0.002817 0.001095  2.57 0.010** 0.000672    0.004963 
SDAPGDPt-1 -0.000168 0.000656 -0.26 0.798 -0.001454   0.001119 
SDAPGDPt-2 -0.000175 0.000534 -0.33 0.742 -0.001222   0.000871 
GDPPCAPt-1 -3.64e-08 1.73e-07 -0.21 0.833 -3.75e-07    3.02e-07  
GDPPCAPt-2  5.84e-08 1.21e-07 0.48 0.630 -1.79e-07     2.96e-07 
_CONS -3.70e-06 0.000236 -0.02 0.987 -0.000466    0.000458
 
The Gross Domestic Product per capita and the share of manufacturing are found to be 
significant determinants of greenhouse gases emissions in SSA countries. Increases in 
both per capita GDP and manufacturing share will increase greenhouse gases emissions 
in SSA countries. The coefficients of GDPPCAP  and MANSHARE are both significant 
at 5% level. This result agrees with Shafik’s 1994 findings. Shafik finds evidence of a 
significant positive effect of income on carbon emissions per capita.  Grossman and 
Krueger (1995) use this same random effects estimation procedure and find evidence that 
the environmental quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth in countries with 
real per capita incomes below US$10 000. In SSA region, no country exceeds per capita 
real income of US$10 000, therefore this study’s findings do not deviate from Grossman 
and Krueger’s in terms of the current income variable. However, in terms of the lagged 
income variables, this study’s findings deviate from Grossman and Krueger’s who find 
evidence of a significant impact of these lagged variables on environmental quality. 
 
4.4 THE DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
The dynamic random effects model indicates the existence of a positive relationship 
between changes in historic emissions and current emissions. However, the study finds 
 48
no evidence to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of 1−Δ tGHGEMPGDP  in model 
(3.2.1.4) is zero. So we find evidence that historical growth rates of GHGEMPGDP  have 
insignificant impact on current growth of greenhouse gases emissions in SSA region. 
Appendix B (II) presents the dynamic Random Effects model. 
 
4.5 THE QUADRATIC AND CUBIC FUNCTIONAL FORMS 
The results in Appendix B (III) provide evidence that the quadratic functional form in 
SDA variable can fit the SSA data well whereas the cubic functional form provides the 
worst fit of the data. In the cubic model, all variables except energy use and 
manufacturing share are insignificant. The poor fit of both the quadratic and cubic models 
in terms of the income variables might be a result of the low levels of per capita income 
in SSA countries. Shafik, Grossman and Krueger find evidence that the quadratic and 
cubic functional forms in income variable provide the best fits for countries with income 
levels in excess of US$8 000 and US$16 000 respectively. So given the maximum per 
capita income of less than US$8000 in SSA countries, quadratic and cubic income terms 
are expected to be insignificant, as evidenced by the results in appendix B (III). Despite 
the negative sign of the squared income coefficient which implies an inverted “U” shaped 
curve for the relationship between greenhouse gases emissions and per capita income, the 
results provide no evidence to support the quadratic functional form in income variable. 
 
In terms of the sustainable development assistance, the quadratic functional form seems 
to provide the best fit. The variables which are significant in the linear random effects 
model presented in section 4.3 are still significant at the 5% level in the quadratic form. 
In addition, the coefficient of the squared term of sustainable development assistance, 
2
itSDAPGDP , is also significant at the 5% level and most importantly, the chi-square test 
for joint significance of the coefficients of the quadratic model provide evidence that the 
coefficients are simultaneously different from zero. The test for joint significance is 
presented together with the quadratic model in appendix B (III). The chi-square test 
statistic is 43.24 and significant at the 1% level, implying that the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the quadratic model are jointly equal to zero is rejected.  
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The coefficient of the SDA squared term (quadratic term) is 0.0019917 (> 0), implying 
that the relationship between SDA and environmental air quality can be illustrated 
through a “U” shaped curve in SSA countries. The quadratic function in terms of SDA 
can be presented as: 
θitititit GSDAPGDPSDAPGDPGHGEMPGDP ++−= 20019917.00013473.00000225.0 , 
where itG  is a vector of all the other variables in the quadratic model in appendix B (III) 
and θ  is a vector of the associated coefficients. By partial differentiation of this function 
with respect to itSDAPGDP  and equating the derivative to zero, we get the turning point
9 
as 0.338. This value means that in SSA region greenhouse gases emissions fall with 
increases in SDA embodied in a unit of output when SDAPGDP is below US$0.338 per 
US$1 of output. Thereafter, greenhouse gases emissions increase with increase in SDA. 
The turning point is within the study data range but is far above individual countries’ 
averages and yearly averages in SSA region.  
 
In the scatter plots presented in figures 4.1 (b) and 4.1 (d), it is indicated that the 
quadratic functional form’s goodness of fit is much explained by the cross-sectional 
dimension of the SSA data (see figure 4.1 (d)). The time-series dimension illustrated in 
figure 4.1 (b) indicates a non-clearly defined relationship between greenhouse gases 
emissions and sustainable development assistance in SSA countries over time. So the 
quadratic model discussed in this section derives its power from the cross-sectional 
dimension. However, the turning point of this quadratic functional model is almost two 
times bigger than the one suggested in the scatter plot of figure 4.1 (d). The reason could 
be that the scatter plot in figure 4.1 (d) only considers cross-sectional dimension and one 
explanatory variable, SDAPGDP. This relationship can be expressed as: 
(4.5.1) )(SDAPGDPfGHGEMPGDP =  
In the estimated quadratic model both the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions are 
considered and more explanatory variables are included. Increases in energy use, per 
capita income, and manufacturing share will increase greenhouse gases emissions. These 
three factors also grow with time. Therefore, besides their direct impact on 
                                                 
9  Turning point is the point at which the slope of the curve is zero. In a “U” curve the turning point defines 
the point where the gradient of the curve changes from negative to positive. 
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GHGEMPGDP, the three factors and the time dimension might also reduce the impact of 
SDAPGDP on reducing GHGEMPGDP. These factors are likely to be the shifting factors 
of the turning point suggested in figure 4.1 (d) to the one in the quadratic model in 
appendix B (III). Let the aggregate impact of these factors on SDAPGDP be -δ  (δ >0) 
and let their direct impact on GHGEMPGDP which is independent of SDAPGDP be π , 
then the quadratic model in appendix B (III) can be viewed as a shift of the function in 
(4.5.1) into: 
(4.5.2) πδ +−= )(SDAPGDPfGHGEMPGDP  
This quadratic curve therefore looks like a combination of a horizontal shift to the right 
of the figure 4.1 (d)-scatter plot represented by function (4.5.1) by δ units and a vertical 
shift of the minimum value by π  units (an upward shift if π >0, a downward shift if π <0 
and no change in the minimum value if π =0). A detailed discussion on shifting graphs 
can be found in mathematics literature (Sydsæter, K and P. Hammond: 2002). Hence δ  
is the difference between the turning point of the quadratic model presented in appendix 
B (III) and the turning point suggested by the scatter plot of figure 4.1 (d). Figure 4.5  in 
appendix B (III) illustrates the sketches of the quadratic curves represented by the model 
in appendix B (III) and suggested by the scatter plot in figure 4.1 (d), assuming that π >0. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
 
The study empirically investigates the impact of financial SDA, per capita income, 
manufacturing share and energy use on greenhouse gases emissions in SSA countries. 
The main objective is to find out whether sustainable development assistance reduces 
greenhouse gases emissions or increases these emissions in SSA countries. The random 
effects estimation procedure finds no evidence that in SSA region, SDA reduces 
greenhouse gases emissions although its coefficient has the expected negative sign. But 
in some individual countries like Zimbabwe the coefficient has a positive sign. In the 
quadratic functional form in terms of SDA variable, the coefficients are jointly significant 
at the 1% level, implying that the impact of SDA on environmental air quality depends on 
the size of the SDA a country receives. The study finds evidence that before the turning 
point explained in section 4.5, increases in SDA reduce greenhouse gases emissions in 
SSA countries and thereafter, increases in SDA increase emissions. Therefore, the study 
finds no evidence that greenhouse gases emission in SSA countries linearly decrease with 
increases in SDA and its lags. In the assumed dynamics, the dynamic random effects 
estimation procedure finds no evidence of a significant impact of previous period 
greenhouse gases emissions on current emissions despite the existence of a priori 
expected positive sign of the autoregressive coefficient. 
 
The random effects results provide evidence that Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
manufacturing share and energy use are significant determinants of environmental air 
quality in SSA countries. In the linear model of section 4.3, per capita income variable is 
significant at the 5% level while the study finds no evidence of a significant impact of the 
lagged variables of per capita income on environmental air quality in SSA. Energy use is 
significant at the 1% level whereas manufacturing share is significant at the 5% level.  
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These variables are also significant in the quadratic model of section 4.5. The study 
findings provide no evidence to reject the main hypothesis of the study that SDA weakly 
reduces greenhouse gases emissions in poor countries. Both the linear and quadratic 
functional forms provide evidence that environmental air quality in SSA deteriorates 
steadily with increases in per capita income, energy use and manufacturing share. 
 
The study is limited to a sample of SSA countries instead of the preferred population 
because of missing data for some countries. Although the study is restricted to a sample 
of 28 SSA countries because of data unavailability, the sample contains more than 60% 
of the SSA countries, making it large enough to be a reliable representative of the region. 
The major limitation of the study pertains to the non-inclusion of variables which are 
thought to be important causes of the ineffectiveness of SDA in poor countries, variables 
such as political instability, corruption levels, research expenditure and technological 
growth. These variables could not be included in the study because of the unavailability 
of the time series data. Hence the study is only limited to explaining whether SDA 
improves environmental quality in SSA or worsens it and not to explaining the causes of 
the ineffectiveness of SDA in improving environmental quality in SSA. 
 
The other limitation of the study is that only one indicator of the environmental quality, 
greenhouse gases emissions, has been considered. There are several indicators of 
environmental quality which include oxygen regime in river basins, fecal contamination 
of river basins, and contamination of river basins by heavy metals, and dust particles in 
air. So there is great risk in generalizing the study’s findings to environmental quality. 
However, greenhouse gases emissions make a reasonable proxy measure for air pollution, 
giving the findings credibility in explaining the efficacy of SDA on environmental air 
quality in SSA countries. 
 
5.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
The findings in chapter four provide an insight into how financial SDA influences 
greenhouse gases emissions in SSA countries. In view of these findings, it is evidenced 
that increases in financial SDA improves environmental quality in SSA countries with 
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average SDAPGDP below US$0.338 in a US$1 unit of output. The researcher therefore 
recommends that developed countries should continue with their policy of financing 
sustainable development in these countries since most of these countries’ average 
SDAPGDP is far below the turning point of US$0.338. In particular, the study 
recommends financial sustainable development assistance to be directed towards those 
countries with average SDAPGDP below the turning point, that is, the provision of SDA 
should depend on the receiving country’s current size of assistance. 
 
The theoretical framework of chapter five argues that ineffectiveness might be either a 
result of the developed countries demanding higher than optimal environmental quality 
from poor countries in the absence of moral hazard or a result of governments of poor 
countries producing greater than optimal output in the presence of moral hazard. In the 
case that the former is the cause of ineffectiveness of SDA, the study recommends the 
assistance providers to review their demands for environmental quality and if the later is 
the cause of ineffectiveness, it is recommended that the growth of non-state actors be 
encouraged and made the administrators of the financial assistance in poor countries. 
 
5.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHES 
The researcher suggests that future studies on the efficacy of SDA on environmental 
quality in SSA countries should include social variables such as education, corruption 
levels, policy ratings and other endowment variables such as climate and all indicators of 
environmental quality. The researcher also suggests that future researchers should 
consider a variety of functional forms of the applied methodology and a variety of 
environmental quality indicators such as fecal, and heavy metal contamination of river 
basins and dust particles in air. 
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5.4 A SUGGESTED MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCING 
In the case of ineffectiveness caused by developing countries, the researcher also 
suggests a model of post-cure10 financial assistance, in which developing countries only 
obtain financial SDA from developed countries (as compensation to output loss due to 
the effort diverted from output production to environmental air quality improvements) if 
there is evidence of an improvement in environmental quality. Such assistance is 
dependent upon the effort put by the receiver in improving environmental quality. 
Assistance provided in this way cannot be abused by developing countries because it is 
only provided after the effort has already been applied. The model assumes that 
developing countries seek to maximize utility through the optimal allocation of effort 
between environmental financial assistance generating activities and all other output 
growth activities. Let Q  be the given level of environmental quality. Suppose the 
developing country gives out α  fraction of its effort to improve the environmental 
quality and use the rest of the remaining effort ( α−1 ) on all other activities like output 
production. The quality of the environment will depend onα , that is;   
(5.2.1) Q  = f (α )  
Let also S  be the size of the financial assistance given to a developing country by 
developed countries. According to the post-cure model, S  depends on how much effort 
or environmental improvements have been achieved by the developing country in 
question. Financial assistance, S , is therefore a proportion of the environmental quality 
value. Suppose the developed country provides λ  fraction of Q  as the financial 
assistance size, then; 
(5.2.2) S  =  λ Q  = λ f (α )  
By applying effort in environmental activities, the country derives utility from the 
financial reward S  and improved Q . However, in this model it is assumed that poor 
countries derive insignificant utility from environmental air quality improvements hence 
their utility function can be expressed as; 
(5.2.3) )(SUU = = U (λ Q ) = U (λ f (α ))  
                                                 
10 Post-cure refers to “after treatment.” Thus, post-cure sustainable development assistance is the assistance 
given to developing countries to compensate their effort in improving environmental air quality. 
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In applying effort, developing countries also incur some effort costs, )(αC . Such costs 
are considered in utility maximization. Like the receivers of the assistance, rich countries 
also seek to maximize the benefits from the proceeds of the financial assistance they give 
out. The benefit Q  is expressed in monetary terms )(QM .  So the rich country or the 
assistance provider maximizes its expected benefit; 
(5.2.4) E [ ]SQM −)(  = E [ ]SfM −))(( α   
subject to the poor country or the assistance receiver’s participation constraint (PC), 
(5.2.5) E [ ]))(( αλfU  - )(αC *U≥   
and its incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), given by the first order condition for the 
choice of effort given λ , that is, the first order condition of the PC in (5.2.5) is sufficient 
for the ICC. 
(5.2.6) Eλ [ ]))((/ αλfU )(/ αf - )(/ αC = 0  
 Or Eλ [ ]))((/ αλfU )(/ αf = )(/ αC  
 
Condition (5.2.6) states that the optimal effort put by developing countries in 
environmental purification occur when the expected marginal utility from the financial 
assistance is equal to the marginal cost of effort. The optimal effort size therefore 
depends on the size of λ  which ranges from 0 to 1 (λ = [0, 1]). The larger is λ  the larger 
is the incentive for developing countries to increase effort in environmental management. 
If λ = 0 then there is zero financial assistance and developing countries tend to apply 
insignificant effort in environmental quality improvements. On the other hand if λ  = 1 
then whatever improvement in environmental quality made by the poor country will be 
fully financed through the assistance. In this case of full financing, developing countries 
are fully compensated for the forgone output growth (the opportunity cost of 
environmental air quality improvements). Maximum effort is therefore achieved when 
λ = 1 and falling as λ  falls below 1.  
 
In summary the post-cure environmental financial assistance model stipulates that 
financial assistance given to developing countries for environmental quality 
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improvements achieves its objective if supplied as a function of the effort contributed by 
the receiving country in environmental quality improvements. The greater is the 
proportion of the financial assistance in covering the contribution costs the greater is the 
effort applied in environmental quality improvements by these countries. The model is 
derived from the Marshallian productivity theory which states that the labour supplier 
applies more effort when he knows that all the benefits from the marginal unit of effort is 
accrued to himself than when he receives only partial benefits of the marginal unit of 
effort. In other words the Marshallian model which assumes the presence of prohibitive 
monitoring costs by the assistance providers would predict financial sustainable 
development assistance supplied with λ  = 1 to be more efficient than the one supplied 
with λ  < 1 (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Despite its attractive flavor, the post-cure 
environmental financial assistance model is not common in this field. It is therefore left 
for future studies to test Marshall’s proposition that predicts financial assistance supplied 
with λ = 1 to be more efficient than the one supplied with λ < 1.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
Table 4.1 (b) extension 
More year-specific summary statistics (For every 5th year starting from 1971 in 
ascending order) 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.001107 0.001095   0.000031 0.004150 
SDAPGDP 28 0.018253   0.013525    0.000000 0.049341  
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.420655   0.963500 0.494179 4.739638 
GDPPCAP 28 599.3057 755.2459 133.7900 3193.660 
 
 
1971 
MANSHARE 28 0.098929 0.046295 0.030000 0.220000 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.001108 0.001100 0.000029 0.004519 
SDAPGDP 28 0. 045307 0. 054539 0.000000 0.298466 
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.299296 0.806730 0.264658 4.022226 
GDPPCAP 28 801.1729 1479.396 153.3300 7714.230 
 
 
1976 
MANSHARE 28 0.100357 0.047413 0.030000 0.230000 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.001204 0.001019 0.000042 0.003604 
SDAPGDP 28 0.086281 0.076553 0.000000 0.305495 
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.266073 0.699255 0.431182 3.353255 
GDPPCAP 28 714.9979 1030.951 136.2200 4779.750 
 
 
1981 
MANSHARE 28 0.100714 0.053050 0.040000 0.240000 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.000929 0.001088 0.000036 0.004426 
SDAPGDP 28 0.119158 0.097027 0.000000 0.390870 
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.332321 0.871340 0.384801 4.475210 
GDPPCAP 28 686.9416 951.5968 120.8700 4352.960 
 
 
1986 
MANSHARE 28 0.103929 0.051950 0.040000 0.250000 
 
 
 VI
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.000892 0.001193 0.000034 0.004432 
SDAPGDP 28 0.170730 0.128428 0.000000 0.445602 
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.330119 0.714735 0.307262 2.994646 
GDPPCAP 28 673.6414 963.5600 108.060 4189.780 
 
 
1991 
MANSHARE 28 0.115000 0.073055 0.040000 0.370000 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 28 0.001036 0.001114 0.000034 0.003923 
SDAPGDP 28 0.167061 0.235823 0.003070 1.272498 
ENUSEPGDP 28 1.376065 0.795320 0.263414 3.650126 
GDPPCAP 28 653.9950 969.3118 59.45000 4147.480 
 
 
1996 
MANSHARE 28 0.100357 0.047880 0.030000 0.200000 
 
 
Table 4.1 (c) extension 
More country-specific summary statistics (For every 5th country in the study in 
alphabetical arrangement) 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.00115 0.000355 0.000719 0.002279
SDAPGDP 31 0.021839 0.021156 0.000000 0.073692
ENUSEPGDP 31 0.836640 0.177272 0.640392 1.269719
GDPPCAP 31 713.6216 119.9625 504.2100 889.0800
 
Angola 
(co=1) 
MANSHARE 31 0.080000 0.027568 0.030000 0.120000
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.000215 0.000113 0.000067 0.000474
SDAPGDP 31 0.137629 0.068528 0.027117 0.282614
ENUSEPGDP 31 1.006367 0.113513 0.757915 1.194107
GDPPCAP 31 181.8132 20.56021 141.1100 219.4200
 
Chad 
(co=6) 
MANSHARE 31 0.113548 0.016643 0.080000 0.150000
 
 VII
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.001933 0.000898 0.000400 0.003829
SDAPGDP 31 0.018795 0.009935 0.002365 0.042599
ENUSEPGDP 31 0.411347 0.112474 0.264658 0.687477
GDPPCAP 31 4389.680 943.2392 2956.320 7714.230
 
Gabon 
(co=11) 
MANSHARE 31 0.057097 0.015957 0.040000 0.090000
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.000506 0.000124 0.000289 0.000790
SDAPGDP 31 0.079018 0.050586 0.016071 0.244809
ENUSEPGDP 31 1.450851 0.171812 1.133011 1.813975
GDPPCAP 31 295.1626 58.67077 228.3400 410.0600
 
Madag 
(co=16) 
MANSHARE 31 0.110968 0.011360 0.080000 0.130000
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.002380 0.001720 0.000000 0.005162
SDAPGDP 31 0.003980 0.002641 0.000233 0.010872
ENUSEPGDP 31 1.940036 0.272745 1.469602 2.437888
GDPPCAP 31 397.3871 43.12438 322.0000 480.0000
 
 
Nigeria 
(co=21) 
MANSHARE 31 0.060000 0.022657 0.030000 0.110000
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
GHGEMPGDP 31 0.000072 0.000056 0.000000 0.000218
SDAPGDP 31 0.109893 0.058730 0.027677 0.242296
ENUSEPGDP 31 1.212278 0.223180 0.921965 1.640394
GDPPCAP 31 281.1613 32.07813 203.0000 346.0000
 
 
Togo 
(co=26) 
MANSHARE 31 0.081290 0.016277 0.060000 0.120000
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Table 4.2 (b) 
The country-specific correlation matrix (Example: Zimbabwe-randomly selected) 
 ghgem
pgd
sdapgdp 
enusepgdp 
gdppcap 
m
anshare 
sdapgdp
t-1  
sdapgdp
t-2  
G
dppcap
t-1 
gdppcap
t-2  
ghgem
pgd
 1.0000 
        
sdapgdp 
 0.2548 
 1.0000 
       
enusepgdp 
 0.3499 
 -0.2931 
 1.0000 
      
gdppcap 
-0.0959 
-0.2375 
-0.5400 
 1.0000 
     
m
anshare 
 0.4319 
 0.6445 
 0.2023 
 -0.2303 
 1.0000 
    
sdapgdp
t-1  
 0.3240 
 0.3146 
-0.0286 
-0.1197 
 0.0980 
1.0000 
   
sdapgdp
t-2  
 0.3515 
 0.1055 
 0.0178 
 0.0600 
-0.1151 
0.5643 
1.0000 
  
gdppcap
t-1  
-0.2300 
 0.0715 
-0.3862 
-0.3771 
 0.0068 
-0.7417 
-0.4801 
1.0000 
 
gdppcap
t-2  
-0.1988 
 0.1633 
-0.2774 
 0.0056 
 0.0709 
-0.4626 
-0.8151 
0.6965 
1.0000 
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Table 4.2 (c) 
The period-specific correlation matrix (Example: 2000-randomly selected) 
 ghgem
pgd
sdapgdp 
enusepgdp 
gdppcap 
m
anshare 
sdapgdp
t-1  
sdapgdp
t-2  
G
dppcap
t-1 
gdppcap
t-2  
ghgem
pgd
  1.0000 
        
sdapgdp 
 -0.0500 
 1.0000 
       
enusepgdp 
 -0.1235 
 0.4274 
 1.0000 
      
gdppcap 
  0.2480 
-0.4629 
-0.5480 
 1.0000 
     
m
anshare 
  0.3265 
 0.0871 
-0.0780 
-0.0595 
 1.0000 
    
sdapgdp
t-1  
 -0.0499 
 0.9417 
 0.4069 
-0.4745 
 0.0828 
1.0000 
   
sdapgdp
t-2  
 -0.0839 
 0.8685 
 0.4087 
-0.4806 
 0.1554 
0.9228 
1.0000 
  
gdppcap
t-1  
  0.2551 
-0.4648 
-0.5486 
 0.9992 
-0.0472 
-0.4777 
-0.4829 
1.0000 
 
gdppcap
t-2  
 0.2414  
-0.4637 
-0.5437 
 0.9942 
-0.0544 
-0.4759 
-0.4829 
0.9974 
1.0000 
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APPENDIX B (I) 
 
Panel Regressions and The Hausman Test 
 
tsset co yr 
panel variable:  co, 1 to 28 
time variable:  yr, 1970 to 2000 
 
.xtreg ghgempgdp sdapgdp enusepgdp gdppcap manshare sdapgdpt-1 sdapgdpt-2 
gdppcapt-1  gdppcapt-2,fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       866 
Group variable (i): co                                 Number of groups =        28 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0289                             Obs per group: min  =        29 
         between = 0.1832                                                       avg =      30.9 
           overall = 0.1063                                                      max =        31 
 
F(8,830)           =      3.09 
  corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0861                                Prob > F           =    0.0019 
 
 
ghgempgdp    Coef.        Std. Err.      t         P>t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
sdapgdp       6.90e-06    .0005438     0.01   0.990    -.0010604    .0010742 
enusepgdp   .0004509   .0000969     4.65   0.000     .0002606     .0006411 
gdppcap       2.23e-07    1.69e-07     1.32   0.186    -1.08e-07       5.55e-07 
manshare    .0018303    .0011853     1.54   0.123   -.0004963     .0041569 
sdapgdpt-1  -.0001813   .0006525    -0.28   0.781    -.0014621     .0010995 
sdapgdpt-2  -.0002076   .0005315    -0.39   0.696    -.0012507     .0008356 
gdppcapt-1  -2.47e-08     1.72e-07    -0.14   0.886    -3.62e-07      3.13e-07 
gdppcapt-2    4.35e-08    1.21e-07     0.36   0.719     -1.93e-07       2.80e-07 
_cons          .0001619    .0002249     0.72   0.472    -.0002796     .0006035 
 
sigma_u   .00083778 
sigma_e   .00090303 
rho   .46257076   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(27, 830) =    20.46             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. est store fixed 
 
. xtreg ghgempgdp sdapgdp enusepgdp gdppcap manshare sdapgdp1 sdapgdp2 
gdppcap1  gdppcap2,re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression            Number of obs      =       866 
Group variable (i): co                          Number of groups   =        28 
 R-sq:  within  = 0.0267                       Obs per group: min = 29 
 XI
        between = 0.3101                                                 avg = 30.9 
          overall = 0.1676                                                 max = 31 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                Wald chi2(8)       =     36.41 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                   Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
ghgempgdp       Coef.      Std. Err.      z        P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
sdapgdp       -.0000223    .000545    -0.04   0.967    -.0010904    .0010458 
enusepgdp  .0004262*** .0000882     4.83   0.000     .0002533      .000599 
gdppcap      3.60e-07**    1.50e-07     2.39   0.017     6.50e-08      6.54e-07 
manshare   .0028174**   .0010948     2.57   0.010     .0006717    .0049631 
sdapgdpt-1    -.0001676   .0006562    -0.26   0.798    -.0014536    .0011185 
sdapgdpt-2    -.0001754   .0005337    -0.33   0.742    -.0012216    .0008707 
gdppcapt-1     -3.64e-08   1.73e-07    -0.21   0.833    -3.75e-07       3.02e-07 
gdppcapt-2      5.84e-08   1.21e-07     0.48    0.630    -1.79e-07      2.96e-07 
_cons            -3.70e-06   .0002357   -0.02    0.987    -.0004657    .0004583 
sigma_u   .00066573 
sigma_e   .00090303 
rho   .35211889   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
hausman fixed 
  ---- Coefficients ---- 
    (b)                 (B)                 (b-B)        sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  fixed                 .                Difference            S.E. 
 
sdapgdp         6.90e-06       -.0000223        .0000292            . 
enusepgdp     .0004509        .0004262        .0000247           .0000402 
gdppcap         2.23e-07         3.60e-07        -1.36e-07           7.67e-08 
manshare      .0018303        .0028174       -.0009871           .0004545 
sdapgdpt-1     -.0001813      -.0001676       -.0000137               . 
sdapgdpt-2     -.0002076      -.0001754       -.0000321               . 
gdppcapt-      -2.47e-08        -3.64e-08         1.17e-08               . 
gdppcapt-2      4.35e-08         5.84e-08        -1.49e-08                
 b = Within
Λβ  = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
 B = GLS
Λβ  = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
      chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                  =7.89 
Prob>chi2 =  0.2463 
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APPENDIX B (II) 
 
The Dynamic Random Effects Model 
 
. xtivreg Δ ghgempgdp ( Δ ghgempgdpt-1= ghgempgdpt-2 ghgempgdpt-3 
Δ ghgempgdpt-3) sdapgdp enusepgdp gdppcap manshare sdapgdpt-1 sdapgdpt-2 
gdppcapt-1 gdppcapt-2, re 
 
G2SLS random-effects IV regression              Number of obs      =  864 
Group variable: co                                         Number of groups   =  28 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0541                                 Obs per group: min = 27 
         between = 0.4741                                                          avg = 30.9 
           overall = 0.0461                                                         max = 31 
 
Wald chi2(9) = 8.11 
 corr(u_i, X)  = 0 (assumed)                               Prob > chi2        =    0.5235 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Δ ghgempgdp        Coef.      Std. Err.       z        P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Δghgempgdpt-1.  .0802543   .0662643     1.21   0.226    -.0496214    .2101299 
Sdapgdp               .0003523   .0006256     0.56   0.573    -.0008739    .0015785 
enusepgdp          -.0000247   .0000522    -0.47   0.637    -.0001271    .0000777 
gdppcap                3.04e-07** 1.42e-07     2.14   0.033       2.53e-08     5.82e-07 
manshare             .0006431  .0006905     0.93   0.352    -.0007103     .0019965 
sdapgdpt-1                -.0003703  .0007717    -0.48   0.631    -.0018828    .0011422 
sdapgdpt-2            .0000534   .0006229     0.09   0.932    -.0011675    .0012744 
gdppcapt-1                -3.72e-07*   2.04e-07    -1.82   0.068    -7.73e-07      2.82e-08 
gdppcapt-2                  5.57e-08    1.43e-07     0.39   0.697    -2.24e-07      3.36e-07 
_cons                 -.0000274    .0001198   -0.23   0.819    -.0002622    .0002074 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u =  0 
     sigma_e = .00110981 
             rho =  0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Instrumented:   Δghgempgdpt-1 
Instruments:    sdapgdp, enusepgdp, gdppcap, manshare, sdapgdpt-1, sdapgdpt-2, 
gdppcapt-1, gdppcapt-2, ghgempgdpt-2, ghgempgdpt-3, Δ ghgempgdpt-3 
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APPENDIX B (III) 
 
The Quadratic Functional Form 
 
xtreg ghgempgdp sdapgdp enusepgdp gdppcap manshare sdapgdpt-1 sdapgdpt-2 
gdppcapt-1 gdppcapt-2 sdapgdp2 gdppcap2 gdppcapt-12 gdppcapt-22 sdapgdpt-12 
sdapgdpt-22, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs    =  866 
Group variable (i): co                                  Number of groups =  28 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0392                             Obs per group: min =        29 
         between = 0.3859                                                      avg =      30.9 
           overall = 0.2121                                                      max =        31 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                    Wald chi2(14)      =     43.24 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                        Prob > chi2        =    0.0001 
 
 
ghgempgdp         Coef.     Std. Err.       z        P>z      [95% Conf. Interval] 
sdapgdp        -.0013473  .0010875    -1.24   0.215    -.0034787    .0007841 
enusepgdp    .0003998***.0000976     4.10   0.000     .0002085    .0005911 
gdppcap        7.43e-07**   2.88e-07     2.58    0.010      1.79e-07    1.31e-06 
manshare     .002953***  .0011067     2.67   0.008      .0007839    .0051221 
sdapgdpt-1     -.0004833   .0013659    -0.35   0.723    -.0031604    .0021939 
sdapgdpt-2     -.0000507   .0010989    -0.05   0.963    -.0022045    .0021032 
gdppcapt-1       3.50e-08   3.07e-07     0.11    0.909      -5.67e-07    6.37e-07 
gdppcapt-2        -2.05e-07    2.32e-07    -0.88   0.376      -6.59e-07    2.49e-07 
sdapgdp2       .0019917**   .001012     1.97    0.049       8.17e-06    .0039752 
gdppcap2        -6.47e-11   4.21e-11    -1.54    0.124     -1.47e-10    1.78e-11 
gdppcapt-12     -1.36e-11   5.16e-11    -0.26    0.791      -1.15e-10    8.74e-11 
gdppcapt-22      4.57e-11   3.93e-11      1.16    0.246      -3.14e-11    1.23e-10 
sdapgdpt-12     .0005301   .0011802      0.45    0.653     -.001783    .0028432 
sdapgdpt-22    .0001448    .0010346      0.14    0.889    -.0018829    .0021725 
_cons             .0000225    .0002859      0.08    0.937     -.000538    .0005829 
 
sigma_u   .00072635 
sigma_e   .00090102 
rho   .39388878   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
. test sdapgdp = enusepgdp = gdppcap = manshare = sdapgdpt-1= sdapgdpt-2 =  
gdppcapt-1 = gdppcapt-2 = sdapgdp2= gdppcap2 =gdppcapt-12 =gdppcapt-22 =sdapgdpt-12 = 
sdapgdpt-22 =0 
( 1)  sdapgdp - enusepgdp = 0 
( 2)  sdapgdp - gdppcap = 0 
( 3)  sdapgdp - manshare = 0 
( 4)  sdapgdp - sdapgdp1 = 0 
( 5)  sdapgdp - sdapgdp2 = 0 
 XIV
( 6)  sdapgdp - gdppcap1 = 0 
( 7)  sdapgdp - gdppcap2 = 0 
( 8)  sdapgdp - sdapgdpSQ = 0 
( 9)  sdapgdp - gdppcapSQ = 0 
(10)  sdapgdp - gdppcap1SQ = 0 
(11)  sdapgdp - gdppcap2SQ = 0 
(12)  sdapgdp - sdapgdp1SQ = 0 
(13)  sdapgdp - sdapgdp2SQ = 0 
(14)  sdapgdp = 0 
Constraint 10 dropped 
Constraint 11 dropped 
Constraint 14 dropped 
 
chi2( 11) =   43.24 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Figure 4.5 
Sketched graphs of the quadratic function 
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The Cubic Functional Form 
 
xtreg ghgempgdp sdapgdp enusepgdp gdppcap manshare sdapgdpt-1 sdapgdpt-2 
gdppcapt-1 gdppcapt-2 sdapgdp2 sdapgdp3 gdppcap2 gdppcap3 gdppcapt-12 gdppcapt-22 
gdppcapt-13  sdapgdpt-12 sdapgdpt-22  sdapgdpt-13,re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 866 
Group variable         (i): co      Number of groups   =  28 
 
R-sq:  within = 0.0433                  Obs per group: min =  29 
between = 0.4271                                           avg =  30.9 
 overall = 0.2335                                          max =  31 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(18)      = 45.03 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        = 0.0004 
 
    
ghgempgdp        Coef.       Std. Err.        z        P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
sdapgdp -.0007783   .0017593  -0.44    0.658    -.0042265 .0026698 
enusepgdp    .0004741***   .0001071    4.43   0.000     .0002642 .000684 
gdppcap   9.13e-07   7.27e-07     1.26    0.209    -5.12e-07 2.34e-06 
manshare     .0029404***     .001105     2.66    0.008     .0007746 .0051062 
sdapgdpt-1           -.0018004   .0020368   -0.88    0.377    -.0057925 .0021918 
sdapgdpt-2  .0001314   .0011079      0.12    0.906      -.00204 .0023028 
gdppcapt-1   7.55e-07    7.31e-07     1.03    0.301    -6.77e-07  2.19e-06 
gdppcapt-2 -2.68e-07     2.38e-07    -1.13    0.260    -7.35e-07  1.98e-07 
sdapgdp2  .0005924    .0044508     0.13    0.894    -.0081311  .0093158 
sdapgdp3  .0006092      .002746     0.22    0.824    -.0047728     .0059912 
gdppcap2 -1.43e-10     2.56e-10    -0.56    0.577    -6.45e-10   3.59e-10 
gdppcap3   8.99e-15    2.15e-14      0.42    0.676    -3.31e-14    5.11e-14 
gdppcapt-12 -3.01e-10     2.60e-10    -1.16    0.246    -8.10e-10    2.08e-10 
gdppcapt-22   7.00e-11     4.28e-11      1.63    0.102    -1.40e-11    1.54e-10 
gdppcapt-13   2.45e-14    2.08e-14      1.18    0.239    -1.63e-14    6.53e-14 
sdapgdpt-12  .0051823    .0048247      1.07    0.283    -.0042739   .0146385 
sdapgdpt-22  .0001435    .0010394      0.14    0.890    -.0018937    .0021807 
sdapgdpt-13     -.0030503    .0030154     -1.01    0.312    -.0089604   .0028598 
_cons            -.0003228    .0003669     -0.88    0.379    -.0010419    .0003963 
    
sigma_u .0007076 
sigma_e .00090118 
rho             .38139176   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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APPENDIX C                        
Table C: Study Data  
Country yr co ghgempgdp sdapgdp enusepgdp gdppcap manshare Sdapgdpt-1 sdapgdpt-2 gdppcapt-1 gdppcapt-2 
Angola 1970 1 0.00155 0 1.26972 504.34 0.12   
 1971 1 0.00145 0 1.25394 504.21 0.11 0  504.34 
 1972 1 0.00152 0.00002 1.06889 623.71 0.12 0 0 504.21 504.34
 1973 1 0.00149 0.00003 0.65287 671.34 0.11 0.00002 0 623.71 504.21
 1974 1 0.00147 0.00009 0.97858 661.91 0.1 0.00003 0.00002 671.34 623.71
 1975 1 0.00120 0.00010 0.85910 721.87 0.1 0.00009 0.00003 661.91 671.34
 1976 1 0.00079 0.00313 0.73968 799.63 0.1 0.00010 0.00009 721.87 661.91
 1977 1 0.00074 0.00745 0.64039 889.08 0.09 0.00313 0.00010 799.63 721.87
 1978 1 0.00113 0.00730 0.70348 870.7 0.1 0.00745 0.00313 889.08 799.63
 1979 1 0.00110 0.00704 0.68804 881.13 0.1 0.00730 0.00745 870.7 889.08
 1980 1 0.00107 0.00777 0.69490 861.05 0.09 0.00704 0.00730 881.13 870.7
 1981 1 0.00113 0.00992 0.74716 779.19 0.11 0.00777 0.00704 861.05 881.13
 1982 1 0.00099 0.00936 0.73528 752.07 0.09 0.00992 0.00777 779.19 861.05
 1983 1 0.00098 0.01123 0.72540 756.34 0.09 0.00936 0.00992 752.07 779.19
 1984 1 0.00096 0.01339 0.70728 775.24 0.09 0.01123 0.00936 756.34 752.07
 1985 1 0.00087 0.01253 0.74431 778.18 0.08 0.01339 0.01123 775.24 756.34
 1986 1 0.00085 0.01755 0.73334 778.51 0.08 0.01253 0.01339 778.18 775.24
 1987 1 0.00097 0.01679 0.69863 819.66 0.11 0.01755 0.01253 778.51 778.18
 1988 1 0.00082 0.01857 0.68392 845.45 0.08 0.01679 0.01755 819.66 778.51
 1989 1 0.00078 0.01968 0.69522 828.15 0.06 0.01857 0.01679 845.45 819.66
 1990 1 0.00074 0.03140 0.74258 803.62 0.05 0.01968 0.01857 828.15 845.45
 1991 1 0.00072 0.03313 0.76175 770.58 0.06 0.03140 0.01968 803.62 828.15
 1992 1 0.00076 0.04414 0.82040 694.88 0.07 0.03313 0.03140 770.58 803.62
 1993 1 0.00136 0.04937 1.13130 506.57 0.08 0.04414 0.03313 694.88 770.58
 1994 1 0.00093 0.07369 1.12533 508.33 0.05 0.04937 0.04414 506.57 694.88
 1995 1 0.00228 0.06216 1.02171 545.5 0.06 0.07369 0.04937 508.33 506.57
 1996 1 0.00181 0.06166 0.94148 591.3 0.03 0.06216 0.07369 545.5 508.33
 1997 1 0.00106 0.04413 0.89520 623.21 0.03 0.06166 0.06216 591.3 545.5
 1998 1 0.00102 0.03906 0.82442 650.76 0.06 0.04413 0.06166 623.21 591.3
 1999 1 0.00101 0.04372 0.85724 656.42 0.03 0.03906 0.04413 650.76 623.21
 2000 1 0.00103 0.03261 0.79429 669.34 0.03 0.04372 0.03906 656.42 650.76
Benin 1970 2 0.00096 0.01771 1.26778 294.12 0.1 0.03261 0.04372 669.34 656.42
 1971 2 0.00108 0.03536 1.35479 282.79 0.11 0.01771 0.03261 294.12 669.34
 1972 2 0.00110 0.02299 1.33488 293.57 0.11 0.03536 0.01771 282.79 294.12
 1973 2 0.00106 0.02928 1.31260 296.77 0.11 0.02299 0.03536 293.57 282.79
 1974 2 0.01906 0.03538 1.29698 298.77 0.13 0.02928 0.02299 296.77 293.57
 1975 2 0.00098 0.06087 1.40424 276.67 0.12 0.03538 0.02928 298.77 296.77
 1976 2 0.00080 0.05661 1.35065 271.67 0.09 0.06087 0.03538 276.67 298.77
 1977 2 0.00074 0.05187 1.33649 277.45 0.09 0.05661 0.06087 271.67 276.67
 1978 2 0.00089 0.06332 1.37236 273.07 0.11 0.05187 0.05661 277.45 271.67
 1979 2 0.00088 0.08332 1.30983 282.41 0.09 0.06332 0.05187 273.07 277.45
 1980 2 0.00065 0.08138 1.25708 292.32 0.08 0.08332 0.06332 282.41 273.07
 1981 2 0.00048 0.06815 1.14746 311.07 0.07 0.08138 0.08332 292.32 282.41
 1982 2 0.00057 0.06539 1.16012 307.4 0.09 0.06815 0.08138 311.07 292.32
 1983 2 0.00072 0.07284 1.24891 284.04 0.09 0.06539 0.06815 307.4 311.07
 XVII
 1984 2 0.00065 0.05962 1.18416 296.21 0.08 0.07284 0.06539 284.04 307.4
 1985 2 0.00075 0.06942 1.15518 307.97 0.08 0.05962 0.07284 296.21 284.04
 1986 2 0.00067 0.09743 1.14150 304.53 0.07 0.06942 0.05962 307.97 296.21
 1987 2 0.00051 0.09817 1.17428 290.51 0.07 0.09743 0.06942 304.53 307.97
 1988 2 0.00056 0.11220 1.16262 290.92 0.08 0.09817 0.09743 290.51 304.53
 1989 2 0.00064 0.19585 1.20627 273.43 0.08 0.11220 0.09817 290.92 290.51
 1990 2 0.00069 0.18904 1.18856 272.64 0.08 0.19585 0.11220 273.43 290.92
 1991 2 0.00074 0.17968 1.15186 275.38 0.08 0.18904 0.19585 272.64 273.43
 1992 2 0.00078 0.17496 1.13347 275.95 0.08 0.17968 0.18904 275.38 272.64
 1993 2 0.00098 0.18047 1.12382 275.23 0.08 0.17496 0.17968 275.95 275.38
 1994 2 0.00102 0.15400 1.10081 277.15 0.09 0.18047 0.17496 275.23 275.95
 1995 2 0.00101 0.16115 1.07539 280.29 0.09 0.15400 0.18047 277.15 275.23
 1996 2 0.00094 0.15689 1.18455 286.7 0.08 0.16115 0.15400 280.29 277.15
 1997 2 0.00102 0.11336 1.15448 295.44 0.09 0.15689 0.16115 286.7 280.29
 1998 2 0.00091 0.10084 1.09697 300.09 0.09 0.11336 0.15689 295.44 286.7
 1999 2 0.00097 0.09899 1.10125 305.18 0.09 0.10084 0.11336 300.09 295.44
 2000 2 0.00099 0.10575 0.89186 313.3 0.09 0.09899 0.10084 305.18 300.09
Botswana 1970 3 0.00003 0.04757 0.73128 397.92 0.04 0.10575 0.09899 313.3 305.18
 1971 3 0.00006 0.04700 0.60168 485.11 0.04 0.04757 0.10575 397.92 313.3
 1972 3 0.00007 0.06620 0.50207 593.36 0.04 0.04700 0.04757 485.11 397.92
 1973 3 0.00012 0.06267 0.44749 696.19 0.05 0.06620 0.04700 593.36 485.11
 1974 3 0.00018 0.05821 0.43666 732.31 0.05 0.06267 0.06620 696.19 593.36
 1975 3 0.00037 0.07502 0.75169 767.63 0.06 0.05821 0.06267 732.31 696.19
 1976 3 0.00107 0.06306 0.85209 820.9 0.07 0.07502 0.05821 767.63 732.31
 1977 3 0.00125 0.05614 0.79119 888.65 0.07 0.06306 0.07502 820.9 767.63
 1978 3 0.00117 0.07147 0.71694 981.93 0.07 0.05614 0.06306 888.65 820.9
 1979 3 0.00118 0.09212 0.66478 1064.3 0.08 0.07147 0.05614 981.93 888.65
 1980 3 0.00110 0.08711 0.62060 1152.02 0.05 0.09212 0.07147 1064.3 981.93
 1981 3 0.00103 0.07319 0.58876 1214.64 0.05 0.08711 0.09212 1152.02 1064.3
 1982 3 0.00101 0.06854 0.55061 1317.46 0.08 0.07319 0.08711 1214.64 1152.02
 1983 3 0.00083 0.06165 0.49142 1442.18 0.07 0.06854 0.07319 1317.46 1214.64
 1984 3 0.00078 0.05614 0.46209 1515.56 0.06 0.06165 0.06854 1442.18 1317.46
 1985 3 0.00081 0.04916 0.45603 1573.16 0.07 0.05614 0.06165 1515.56 1442.18
 1986 3 0.00085 0.04784 0.46245 1650.51 0.06 0.04916 0.05614 1573.16 1515.56
 1987 3 0.00088 0.06577 0.41122 1792.78 0.06 0.04784 0.04916 1650.51 1573.16
 1988 3 0.00078 0.05327 0.40649 2080.79 0.05 0.06577 0.04784 1792.78 1650.51
 1989 3 0.00076 0.04968 0.38408 2287.41 0.05 0.05327 0.06577 2080.79 1792.78
 1990 3 0.00086 0.04278 0.37474 2376.17 0.05 0.04968 0.05327 2287.41 2080.79
 1991 3 0.00079 0.03593 0.36490 2486.03 0.05 0.04278 0.04968 2376.17 2287.41
 1992 3 0.00118 0.02964 0.39585 2493.34 0.06 0.03593 0.04278 2486.03 2376.17
 1993 3 0.00123 0.03369 0.38841 2478.98 0.06 0.02964 0.03593 2493.34 2486.03
 1994 3 0.00118 0.02149 0.36951 2509.12 0.05 0.03369 0.02964 2478.98 2493.34
 1995 3 0.00114 0.02163 0.36238 2562.19 0.05 0.02149 0.03369 2509.12 2478.98
 1996 3 0.00096 0.01704 0.33325 2648.5 0.05 0.02163 0.02149 2562.19 2509.12
 1997 3 0.00090 0.02559 0.31786 2861.6 0.05 0.01704 0.02163 2648.5 2562.19
 1998 3 0.00097 0.01996 0.32539 3110.28 0.05 0.02559 0.01704 2861.6 2648.5
 1999 3 0.00083 0.01067 0.31119 3287.94 0.05 0.01996 0.02559 3110.28 2861.6
 2000 3 0.00091 0.00496 0.29819 3521.77 0.04 0.01067 0.01996 3287.94 3110.28
Camerun 1970 4 0.00027 0.01758 0.79589 508.54 0.1 0.00496 0.01067 3521.77 3287.94
 XVIII
 1971 4 0.00032 0.01382 0.78864 513.19 0.1 0.01758 0.00496 508.54 3521.77
 1972 4 0.00032 0.01754 0.78793 513.61 0.1 0.01382 0.01758 513.19 508.54
 1973 4 0.00033 0.01612 0.76324 527.16 0.1 0.01754 0.01382 513.61 513.19
 1974 4 0.00031 0.01480 0.70481 568.24 0.1 0.01612 0.01754 527.16 513.61
 1975 4 0.00033 0.02357 0.66001 614.81 0.1 0.01480 0.01612 568.24 527.16
 1976 4 0.00034 0.03073 0.70795 564.59 0.11 0.02357 0.01480 614.81 568.24
 1977 4 0.00041 0.03589 0.66984 623.55 0.12 0.03073 0.02357 564.59 614.81
 1978 4 0.00044 0.02945 0.56872 738.48 0.12 0.03589 0.03073 623.55 564.59
 1979 4 0.00037 0.04281 0.55739 760.31 0.08 0.02945 0.03589 738.48 623.55
 1980 4 0.00082 0.04177 0.58481 724.13 0.1 0.04281 0.02945 760.31 738.48
 1981 4 0.00097 0.02672 0.52400 824.25 0.1 0.04177 0.04281 724.13 760.31
 1982 4 0.00107 0.02657 0.50943 862.03 0.12 0.02672 0.04177 824.25 724.13
 1983 4 0.00104 0.01497 0.49334 896.23 0.12 0.02657 0.02672 862.03 824.25
 1984 4 0.00088 0.01996 0.47377 936.75 0.12 0.01497 0.02657 896.23 862.03
 1985 4 0.00087 0.01540 0.45528 983.83 0.11 0.01996 0.01497 936.75 896.23
 1986 4 0.00024 0.02047 0.43265 1020.28 0.1 0.01540 0.01996 983.83 936.75
 1987 4 0.00022 0.01963 0.45025 969.34 0.1 0.02047 0.01540 1020.28 983.83
 1988 4 0.00030 0.02890 0.50399 867.45 0.12 0.01963 0.02047 969.34 1020.28
 1989 4 0.00106 0.04834 0.53212 827.11 0.14 0.02890 0.01963 867.45 969.34
 1990 4 0.00025 0.05054 0.57230 754.66 0.12 0.04834 0.02890 827.11 867.45
 1991 4 0.00015 0.06105 0.60052 705.86 0.12 0.05054 0.04834 754.66 827.11
 1992 4 0.00059 0.08721 0.62630 665.51 0.14 0.06105 0.05054 705.86 754.66
 1993 4 0.00062 0.06853 0.66832 627.29 0.21 0.08721 0.06105 665.51 705.86
 1994 4 0.00063 0.09438 0.70639 596.07 0.22 0.06853 0.08721 627.29 665.51
 1995 4 0.00070 0.05542 0.69497 600.67 0.22 0.09438 0.06853 596.07 627.29
 1996 4 0.00075 0.04889 0.67845 615.87 0.2 0.05542 0.09438 600.67 596.07
 1997 4 0.00049 0.05660 0.66798 632.67 0.2 0.04889 0.05542 615.87 600.67
 1998 4 0.00046 0.05387 0.65461 650.1 0.2 0.05660 0.04889 632.67 615.87
 1999 4 0.00043 0.04494 0.63482 664.39 0.19 0.05387 0.05660 650.1 632.67
 2000 4 0.00046 0.03765 0.63206 678.16 0.21 0.04494 0.05387 664.39 650.1
CAR 1970 5 0.00043 0.02234 0.90978 343.71 0.07 0.03765 0.04494 678.16 664.39
 1971 5 0.00040 0.02390 0.91426 341.02 0.07 0.02234 0.03765 343.71 678.16
 1972 5 0.00032 0.03943 0.89585 334.8 0.06 0.02390 0.02234 341.02 343.71
 1973 5 0.00032 0.03864 0.96041 334.9 0.06 0.03943 0.02390 334.8 341.02
 1974 5 0.00019 0.05190 1.08041 349.34 0.05 0.03864 0.03943 334.9 334.8
 1975 5 0.00020 0.07737 1.06587 343.56 0.06 0.05190 0.03864 349.34 334.9
 1976 5 0.00023 0.05185 1.03528 354.28 0.08 0.07737 0.05190 343.56 349.34
 1977 5 0.00023 0.05795 1.02244 359.26 0.07 0.05185 0.07737 354.28 343.56
 1978 5 0.00027 0.06500 1.03132 354.76 0.08 0.05795 0.05185 359.26 354.28
 1979 5 0.00020 0.10904 1.08075 337.21 0.07 0.06500 0.05795 354.76 359.26
 1980 5 0.00022 0.15081 1.24263 313.57 0.07 0.10904 0.06500 337.21 354.76
 1981 5 0.00027 0.14077 1.30865 300.21 0.07 0.15081 0.10904 313.57 337.21
 1982 5 0.00026 0.11551 1.27142 314.16 0.06 0.14077 0.15081 300.21 313.57
 1983 5 0.00029 0.12981 1.41734 280.42 0.09 0.11551 0.14077 314.16 300.21
 1984 5 0.00027 0.16905 1.41884 298.61 0.08 0.12981 0.11551 280.42 314.16
 1985 5 0.00027 0.12828 1.40214 302.38 0.08 0.16905 0.12981 298.61 280.42
 1986 5 0.00027 0.16118 1.39557 305.81 0.08 0.12828 0.16905 302.38 298.61
 1987 5 0.00043 0.22584 1.37757 284.32 0.09 0.16118 0.12828 305.81 302.38
 1988 5 0.00038 0.25249 1.38149 283.02 0.08 0.22584 0.16118 284.32 305.81
 XIX
 1989 5 0.00043 0.22830 1.16187 282.26 0.11 0.25249 0.22584 283.02 284.32
 1990 5 0.00035 0.30763 1.19328 269.71 0.1 0.22830 0.25249 282.26 283.02
 1991 5 0.00036 0.21559 1.15792 261.47 0.12 0.30763 0.22830 269.71 282.26
 1992 5 0.00040 0.23595 1.26886 238.27 0.12 0.21559 0.30763 261.47 269.71
 1993 5 0.00041 0.22734 1.34004 232.74 0.12 0.23595 0.21559 238.27 261.47
 1994 5 0.00040 0.21147 1.29997 237.86 0.1 0.22734 0.23595 232.74 238.27
 1995 5 0.00038 0.19752 1.23696 248.78 0.1 0.21147 0.22734 237.86 232.74
 1996 5 0.00041 0.20680 1.30552 233.37 0.11 0.19752 0.21147 248.78 237.86
 1997 5 0.00039 0.10606 1.30742 240.42 0.1 0.20680 0.19752 233.37 248.78
 1998 5 0.00038 0.13343 1.50635 246.65 0.09 0.10606 0.20680 240.42 233.37
 1999 5 0.00038 0.12684 1.58651 250.79 0.09 0.13343 0.10606 246.65 240.42
 2000 5 0.00038 0.07898 1.59877 251.08 0.09 0.12684 0.13343 250.79 246.65
Chad 1970 6 0.00018 0.02712 0.97379 219.42 0.11 0.07898 0.12684 251.08 250.79
 1971 6 0.00026 0.03774 1.00972 209.85 0.11 0.02712 0.07898 219.42 251.08
 1972 6 0.00020 0.03776 1.01450 207.65 0.11 0.03774 0.02712 209.85 219.42
 1973 6 0.00029 0.06065 1.13361 186.14 0.13 0.03776 0.03774 207.65 209.85
 1974 6 0.00028 0.10014 1.11666 191.24 0.13 0.06065 0.03776 186.14 207.65
 1975 6 0.00026 0.07812 1.04800 204.18 0.13 0.10014 0.06065 191.24 186.14
 1976 6 0.00026 0.06921 1.03407 206.05 0.11 0.07812 0.10014 204.18 191.24
 1977 6 0.00033 0.09070 1.03516 206.5 0.12 0.06921 0.07812 206.05 204.18
 1978 6 0.00027 0.13753 0.98094 201.49 0.1 0.09070 0.06921 206.5 206.05
 1979 6 0.00035 0.12050 0.92109 155.11 0.14 0.13753 0.09070 201.49 206.5
 1980 6 0.00047 0.05297 0.98956 142.71 0.15 0.12050 0.13753 155.11 201.49
 1981 6 0.00038 0.08922 0.98278 141.11 0.11 0.05297 0.12050 142.71 155.11
 1982 6 0.00037 0.09122 0.95694 145.37 0.11 0.08922 0.05297 141.11 142.71
 1983 6 0.00033 0.10745 0.89894 164.26 0.11 0.09122 0.08922 145.37 141.11
 1984 6 0.00033 0.12990 0.89817 163.51 0.13 0.10745 0.09122 164.26 145.37
 1985 6 0.00021 0.17701 0.75791 193.94 0.1 0.12990 0.10745 163.51 164.26
 1986 6 0.00022 0.16527 0.77065 180.86 0.12 0.17701 0.12990 193.94 163.51
 1987 6 0.00032 0.21308 0.82199 171.39 0.12 0.16527 0.17701 180.86 193.94
 1988 6 0.00007 0.23841 0.90416 191.98 0.09 0.21308 0.16527 171.39 180.86
 1989 6 0.00014 0.21846 0.91136 195.28 0.13 0.23841 0.21308 191.98 171.39
 1990 6 0.00015 0.28261 0.97080 181.52 0.14 0.21846 0.23841 195.28 191.98
 1991 6 0.00007 0.21991 0.98289 191.17 0.08 0.28261 0.21846 181.52 195.28
 1992 6 0.00007 0.18375 0.98039 200.38 0.08 0.21991 0.28261 191.17 181.52
 1993 6 0.00008 0.20582 1.19411 163.93 0.09 0.18375 0.21991 200.38 191.17
 1994 6 0.00008 0.17748 1.11214 175.23 0.11 0.20582 0.18375 163.93 200.38
 1995 6 0.00008 0.19409 1.12368 172.14 0.11 0.17748 0.20582 175.23 163.93
 1996 6 0.00008 0.23902 1.13043 170.74 0.11 0.19409 0.17748 172.14 175.23
 1997 6 0.00015 0.17411 1.12739 175.06 0.12 0.23902 0.19409 170.74 172.14
 1998 6 0.00007 0.11977 1.09213 181.6 0.1 0.17411 0.23902 175.06 170.74
 1999 6 0.00015 0.13523 1.15223 174.74 0.11 0.11977 0.17411 181.6 175.06
 2000 6 0.00016 0.09228 1.17121 171.66 0.11 0.13523 0.11977 174.74 181.6
DRC 1970 7 0.00054 0.01326 0.97112 327.96 0.13 0.09228 0.13523 171.66 174.74
 1971 7 0.00056 0.01503 0.94767 337.3 0.16 0.01326 0.09228 327.96 171.66
 1972 7 0.00058 0.01702 0.96803 327.82 0.16 0.01503 0.01326 337.3 327.96
 1973 7 0.00055 0.01797 0.92869 343.98 0.13 0.01702 0.01503 327.82 337.3
 1974 7 0.00059 0.02258 0.92293 344.1 0.14 0.01797 0.01702 343.98 327.82
 1975 7 0.00055 0.02691 0.99587 316.97 0.13 0.02258 0.01797 344.1 343.98
 XX
 1976 7 0.00065 0.02689 1.06881 290.79 0.15 0.02691 0.02258 316.97 344.1
 1977 7 0.00067 0.03591 1.09741 283.74 0.15 0.02689 0.02691 290.79 316.97
 1978 7 0.00068 0.04610 1.19446 260.1 0.16 0.03591 0.02689 283.74 290.79
 1979 7 0.00075 0.06044 1.23473 253.14 0.16 0.04610 0.03591 260.1 283.74
 1980 7 0.00065 0.06065 1.22272 250.94 0.15 0.06044 0.04610 253.14 260.1
 1981 7 0.00070 0.05454 1.25235 249.38 0.16 0.06065 0.06044 250.94 253.14
 1982 7 0.00056 0.04843 1.25797 241.19 0.15 0.05454 0.06065 249.38 250.94
 1983 7 0.00074 0.04274 1.32339 237.73 0.15 0.04843 0.05454 241.19 249.38
 1984 7 0.00067 0.03921 1.31579 243.83 0.1 0.04274 0.04843 237.73 241.19
 1985 7 0.00062 0.03967 1.31032 237.95 0.1 0.03921 0.04274 243.83 237.73
 1986 7 0.00056 0.05232 1.27515 241.98 0.09 0.03967 0.03921 237.95 243.83
 1987 7 0.00062 0.08141 1.29226 241.26 0.1 0.05232 0.03967 241.98 237.95
 1988 7 0.00063 0.06638 1.33386 235.16 0.11 0.08141 0.05232 241.26 241.98
 1989 7 0.00072 0.08894 1.38532 224.88 0.12 0.06638 0.08141 235.16 241.26
 1990 7 0.00073 0.11679 1.55190 203.1 0.12 0.08894 0.06638 224.88 235.16
 1991 7 0.00068 0.06769 1.72993 179.36 0.07 0.11679 0.08894 203.1 224.88
 1992 7 0.00070 0.04270 1.96687 154.56 0.07 0.06769 0.11679 179.36 203.1
 1993 7 0.00073 0.03268 2.31380 128.84 0.07 0.04270 0.06769 154.56 179.36
 1994 7 0.00068 0.04680 2.41718 119.66 0.06 0.03268 0.04270 128.84 154.56
 1995 7 0.00069 0.03701 2.50586 116.99 0.08 0.04680 0.03268 119.66 128.84
 1996 7 0.00072 0.03187 2.61052 112.97 0.09 0.03701 0.04680 116.99 119.66
 1997 7 0.00065 0.03209 2.81429 104.41 0.06 0.03187 0.03701 112.97 116.99
 1998 7 0.00067 0.02590 2.92925 100.78 0.06 0.03209 0.03187 104.41 112.97
 1999 7 0.00072 0.02858 3.12099 94.47 0.07 0.02590 0.03209 100.78 104.41
 2000 7 0.00042 0.03658 2.96766 96.77 0.05 0.02858 0.02590 94.47 100.78
Congo 1970 8 0.00079 0.01657 0.70655 702.65 0.07 0.03658 0.02858 96.77 94.47
 1971 8 0.00088 0.01714 0.67806 734.39 0.08 0.01657 0.03658 702.65 96.77
 1972 8 0.00079 0.02124 0.64448 773.46 0.06 0.01714 0.01657 734.39 702.65
 1973 8 0.00135 0.02261 0.61841 811.53 0.09 0.02124 0.01714 773.46 734.39
 1974 8 0.00169 0.02977 0.58514 848.72 0.1 0.02261 0.02124 811.53 773.46
 1975 8 0.00105 0.04087 0.55327 886.39 0.09 0.02977 0.02261 848.72 811.53
 1976 8 0.00115 0.05260 0.58807 867.25 0.1 0.04087 0.02977 886.39 848.72
 1977 8 0.00048 0.03829 0.63000 765.56 0.09 0.05260 0.04087 867.25 886.39
 1978 8 0.00029 0.06003 0.61327 789.43 0.09 0.03829 0.05260 765.56 867.25
 1979 8 0.00029 0.06139 0.56868 840.35 0.08 0.06003 0.03829 789.43 765.56
 1980 8 0.00028 0.05256 0.49905 958.06 0.05 0.06139 0.06003 840.35 789.43
 1981 8 0.00028 0.03959 0.43118 1091.86 0.06 0.05256 0.06139 958.06 840.35
 1982 8 0.00070 0.03662 0.36838 1307.36 0.06 0.03959 0.05256 1091.86 958.06
 1983 8 0.00056 0.04039 0.37885 1340.47 0.05 0.03662 0.03959 1307.36 1091.86
 1984 8 0.00053 0.03397 0.34501 1388.82 0.05 0.04039 0.03662 1340.47 1307.36
 1985 8 0.00059 0.02457 0.36374 1329.01 0.06 0.03397 0.04039 1388.82 1340.47
 1986 8 0.00053 0.04097 0.38480 1198.62 0.05 0.02457 0.03397 1329.01 1388.82
 1987 8 0.00066 0.05245 0.39170 1162.75 0.09 0.04097 0.02457 1198.62 1329.01
 1988 8 0.00073 0.03245 0.37778 1145.68 0.09 0.05245 0.04097 1162.75 1198.62
 1989 8 0.00046 0.03307 0.38245 1138.2 0.07 0.03245 0.05245 1145.68 1162.75
 1990 8 0.00057 0.07854 0.38192 1113.25 0.08 0.03307 0.03245 1138.2 1145.68
 1991 8 0.00047 0.04707 0.38215 1104.15 0.07 0.07854 0.03307 1113.25 1138.2
 1992 8 0.00058 0.03886 0.37694 1097.43 0.08 0.04707 0.07854 1104.15 1113.25
 1993 8 0.00060 0.04255 0.38353 1052.4 0.08 0.03886 0.04707 1097.43 1104.15
 XXI
 1994 8 0.00105 0.13314 0.27597 963.04 0.1 0.04255 0.03886 1052.4 1097.43
 1995 8 0.00073 0.04375 0.27544 978.74 0.08 0.13314 0.04255 963.04 1052.4
 1996 8 0.00077 0.14423 0.26341 987.57 0.08 0.04375 0.13314 978.74 963.04
 1997 8 0.00107 0.09118 0.25013 949.38 0.09 0.14423 0.04375 987.57 978.74
 1998 8 0.00034 0.02142 0.24512 952.22 0.05 0.09118 0.14423 949.38 987.57
 1999 8 0.00038 0.04762 0.24195 893.82 0.07 0.02142 0.09118 952.22 949.38
 2000 8 0.00043 0.01021 0.26367 936.62 0.05 0.04762 0.02142 893.82 952.22
CoteD'vor 1970 9 0.00071 0.01137 0.51774 870.38 0.1 0.01021 0.04762 936.62 893.82
 1971 9 0.00070 0.01010 0.49418 913.01 0.1 0.01137 0.01021 870.38 936.62
 1972 9 0.00074 0.00915 0.50197 912.21 0.11 0.01010 0.01137 913.01 870.38
 1973 9 0.00074 0.01134 0.49137 925.98 0.1 0.00915 0.01010 912.21 913.01
 1974 9 0.00079 0.01298 0.49415 924.76 0.12 0.01134 0.00915 925.98 912.21
 1975 9 0.00082 0.01580 0.48042 957.06 0.12 0.01298 0.01134 924.76 925.98
 1976 9 0.00072 0.01509 0.45830 1032.05 0.09 0.01580 0.01298 957.06 924.76
 1977 9 0.00068 0.01360 0.43661 1056.95 0.08 0.01509 0.01580 1032.05 957.06
 1978 9 0.00074 0.01528 0.42032 1118.09 0.08 0.01360 0.01509 1056.95 1032.05
 1979 9 0.00080 0.01843 0.41494 1091.35 0.08 0.01528 0.01360 1118.09 1056.95
 1980 9 0.00105 0.02713 0.47369 926.54 0.13 0.01843 0.01528 1091.35 1118.09
 1981 9 0.00071 0.01538 0.45667 914.14 0.12 0.02713 0.01843 926.54 1091.35
 1982 9 0.00099 0.01701 0.45313 873.39 0.14 0.01538 0.02713 914.14 926.54
 1983 9 0.00076 0.02016 0.45958 801.05 0.14 0.01701 0.01538 873.39 914.14
 1984 9 0.00085 0.01640 0.48181 745.11 0.14 0.02016 0.01701 801.05 873.39
 1985 9 0.00121 0.01497 0.48416 745.93 0.15 0.01640 0.02016 745.11 801.05
 1986 9 0.00090 0.02156 0.51671 739.46 0.14 0.01497 0.01640 745.93 745.11
 1987 9 0.00116 0.02984 0.52932 708.82 0.19 0.02156 0.01497 739.46 745.93
 1988 9 0.00141 0.05210 0.53294 690.79 0.2 0.02984 0.02156 708.82 739.46
 1989 9 0.00126 0.04701 0.53472 686.27 0.19 0.05210 0.02984 690.79 708.82
 1990 9 0.00089 0.08269 0.53101 655.84 0.18 0.04701 0.05210 686.27 690.79
 1991 9 0.00085 0.07585 0.54668 634.8 0.18 0.08269 0.04701 655.84 686.27
 1992 9 0.00070 0.09121 0.59051 613.5 0.18 0.07585 0.08269 634.8 655.84
 1993 9 0.00091 0.09228 0.61137 593.93 0.19 0.09121 0.07585 613.5 634.8
 1994 9 0.00081 0.19111 0.62156 581.33 0.15 0.09228 0.09121 593.93 613.5
 1995 9 0.00105 0.13571 0.57909 605.17 0.16 0.19111 0.09228 581.33 593.93
 1996 9 0.00113 0.10023 0.60522 633.97 0.18 0.13571 0.19111 605.17 581.33
 1997 9 0.00106 0.04391 0.58812 652.27 0.21 0.10023 0.13571 633.97 605.17
 1998 9 0.00037 0.09078 0.56048 665.87 0.2 0.04391 0.10023 652.27 633.97
 1999 9 0.00088 0.04140 0.65615 660.67 0.2 0.09078 0.04391 665.87 652.27
 2000 9 0.00076 0.03367 0.65815 622.47 0.19 0.04140 0.09078 660.67 665.87
Ethiopia 1970 10 0.00052 0.01064 2.35311 128.77 0.03 0.03367 0.04140 622.47 660.67
 1971 10 0.00061 0.01181 2.26437 133.79 0.03 0.01064 0.03367 128.77 622.47
 1972 10 0.00041 0.01170 2.26982 132.46 0.03 0.01181 0.01064 133.79 128.77
 1973 10 0.00050 0.01577 2.23468 134.44 0.04 0.01170 0.01181 132.46 133.79
 1974 10 0.00050 0.02677 2.20210 135.97 0.04 0.01577 0.01170 134.44 132.46
 1975 10 0.00030 0.02979 2.21245 134.29 0.03 0.02677 0.01577 135.97 134.44
 1976 10 0.00030 0.03052 2.18880 135.33 0.03 0.02979 0.02677 134.29 135.97
 1977 10 0.00032 0.02593 2.31065 127.67 0.04 0.03052 0.02979 135.33 134.29
 1978 10 0.00042 0.03023 2.28717 129.02 0.05 0.02593 0.03052 127.67 135.33
 1979 10 0.00050 0.03825 2.18359 135.68 0.05 0.03023 0.02593 129.02 127.67
 1980 10 0.00050 0.04118 2.17288 135.99 0.06 0.03825 0.03023 135.68 129.02
 XXII
 1981 10 0.00050 0.04640 2.16884 136.22 0.04 0.04118 0.03825 135.99 135.68
 1982 10 0.00041 0.03746 2.20415 133.48 0.04 0.04640 0.04118 136.22 135.99
 1983 10 0.00039 0.05889 2.09773 140.08 0.04 0.03746 0.04640 133.48 136.22
 1984 10 0.00041 0.06422 2.20501 132.82 0.06 0.05889 0.03746 140.08 133.48
 1985 10 0.00047 0.14472 2.55240 114.5 0.07 0.06422 0.05889 132.82 140.08
 1986 10 0.00056 0.11690 2.42815 120.87 0.05 0.14472 0.06422 114.5 132.82
 1987 10 0.00060 0.10063 2.20616 134.36 0.07 0.11690 0.14472 120.87 114.5
 1988 10 0.00062 0.15580 2.27376 130.04 0.07 0.10063 0.11690 134.36 120.87
 1989 10 0.00065 0.11904 2.38625 123.91 0.08 0.15580 0.10063 130.04 134.36
 1990 10 0.00067 0.16173 2.42787 121.93 0.08 0.11904 0.15580 123.91 130.04
 1991 10 0.00075 0.19082 2.72867 108.06 0.08 0.16173 0.11904 121.93 123.91
 1992 10 0.00073 0.22815 2.96129 93.01 0.07 0.19082 0.16173 108.06 121.93
 1993 10 0.00125 0.18729 2.56666 108.39 0.08 0.22815 0.19082 93.01 108.06
 1994 10 0.00062 0.17901 2.68636 108.15 0.05 0.18729 0.22815 108.39 93.01
 1995 10 0.00049 0.14001 2.63165 110.71 0.05 0.17901 0.18729 108.15 108.39
 1996 10 0.00067 0.11597 2.40733 120.81 0.05 0.14001 0.17901 110.71 108.15
 1997 10 0.00077 0.07924 2.36616 122.16 0.05 0.11597 0.14001 120.81 110.71
 1998 10 0.00095 0.09454 2.55143 114.03 0.05 0.07924 0.11597 122.16 120.81
 1999 10 0.00091 0.08635 2.44742 118.59 0.06 0.09454 0.07924 114.03 122.16
 2000 10 0.00100 0.08745 2.38612 122.01 0.06 0.08635 0.09454 118.59 114.03
Gabon 1970 11 0.00179 0.01518 0.67636 2956.32 0.07 0.08745 0.08635 122.01 118.59
 1971 11 0.00184 0.01375 0.62542 3193.66 0.08 0.01518 0.08745 2956.32 122.01
 1972 11 0.00180 0.01408 0.55028 3471.41 0.08 0.01375 0.01518 3193.66 2956.32
 1973 11 0.00335 0.01852 0.68748 3724.49 0.09 0.01408 0.01375 3471.41 3193.66
 1974 11 0.00256 0.00834 0.53622 5052.07 0.04 0.01852 0.01408 3724.49 3471.41
 1975 11 0.00187 0.01717 0.37230 5853.04 0.04 0.00834 0.01852 5052.07 3724.49
 1976 11 0.00175 0.00712 0.26466 7714.23 0.04 0.01717 0.00834 5853.04 5052.07
 1977 11 0.00222 0.00651 0.33247 6550.87 0.05 0.00712 0.01717 7714.23 5853.04
 1978 11 0.00318 0.01371 0.49393 4831.55 0.06 0.00651 0.00712 6550.87 7714.23
 1979 11 0.00290 0.01150 0.43568 4712.15 0.05 0.01371 0.00651 4831.55 6550.87
 1980 11 0.00256 0.01702 0.42790 4688.76 0.05 0.01150 0.01371 4712.15 4831.55
 1981 11 0.00254 0.01258 0.45641 4779.75 0.04 0.01702 0.01150 4688.76 4712.15
 1982 11 0.00264 0.01860 0.48603 4491.76 0.04 0.01258 0.01702 4779.75 4688.76
 1983 11 0.00209 0.01807 0.47190 4598.95 0.04 0.01860 0.01258 4491.76 4779.75
 1984 11 0.00233 0.01994 0.40927 4791.28 0.05 0.01807 0.01860 4598.95 4491.76
 1985 11 0.00263 0.01648 0.37619 4532.43 0.07 0.01994 0.01807 4791.28 4598.95
 1986 11 0.00218 0.02150 0.39182 4352.96 0.09 0.01648 0.01994 4532.43 4791.28
 1987 11 0.00252 0.02715 0.45739 3491.06 0.08 0.02150 0.01648 4352.96 4532.43
 1988 11 0.00273 0.03092 0.43779 3812.79 0.08 0.02715 0.02150 3491.06 4352.96
 1989 11 0.00383 0.03558 0.36156 4005.43 0.06 0.03092 0.02715 3812.79 3491.06
 1990 11 0.00207 0.03361 0.31836 4078.27 0.06 0.03558 0.03092 4005.43 3812.79
 1991 11 0.00094 0.03445 0.30726 4189.78 0.06 0.03361 0.03558 4078.27 4005.43
 1992 11 0.00094 0.01704 0.33806 3925.97 0.06 0.03445 0.03361 4189.78 4078.27
 1993 11 0.00126 0.02461 0.34652 3895.34 0.06 0.01704 0.03445 3925.97 4189.78
 1994 11 0.00109 0.04260 0.31308 3908.28 0.05 0.02461 0.01704 3895.34 3925.97
 1995 11 0.00111 0.03161 0.31253 4058.54 0.05 0.04260 0.02461 3908.28 3895.34
 1996 11 0.00102 0.02645 0.31457 4147.48 0.04 0.03161 0.04260 4058.54 3908.28
 1997 11 0.00099 0.00769 0.29983 4266.68 0.04 0.02645 0.03161 4147.48 4058.54
 1998 11 0.00042 0.00865 0.31352 4242.89 0.06 0.00769 0.02645 4266.68 4147.48
 XXIII
 1999 11 0.00040 0.00985 0.32430 3884.98 0.05 0.00865 0.00769 4242.89 4266.68
 2000 11 0.00040 0.00237 0.31266 3876.9 0.04 0.00985 0.00865 3884.98 4242.89
Gambia 1970 12 0.00048 0.00988 1.06683 282.36 0.03 0.00237 0.00985 3876.9 3884.98
 1971 12 0.00054 0.02668 1.09641 273.22 0.03 0.00988 0.00237 282.36 3876.9
 1972 12 0.00066 0.03678 1.12293 264.79 0.03 0.02668 0.00988 273.22 282.36
 1973 12 0.00058 0.04444 1.06978 279.47 0.03 0.03678 0.02668 264.79 273.22
 1974 12 0.00057 0.06642 1.05939 285.9 0.03 0.04444 0.03678 279.47 264.79
 1975 12 0.00078 0.04663 0.97654 310.72 0.04 0.06642 0.04444 285.9 279.47
 1976 12 0.00071 0.05861 0.92459 322.79 0.04 0.04663 0.06642 310.72 285.9
 1977 12 0.00079 0.11099 0.92700 323.27 0.05 0.05861 0.04663 322.79 310.72
 1978 12 0.00093 0.16789 0.93973 332.84 0.05 0.11099 0.05861 323.27 322.79
 1979 12 0.00098 0.17080 0.97362 318.04 0.05 0.16789 0.11099 332.84 323.27
 1980 12 0.00099 0.24660 0.95828 327.21 0.06 0.17080 0.16789 318.04 332.84
 1981 12 0.00095 0.30549 0.96024 327.24 0.05 0.24660 0.17080 327.21 318.04
 1982 12 0.00099 0.21068 0.92841 314.27 0.06 0.30549 0.24660 327.24 327.21
 1983 12 0.00088 0.16640 0.87665 337.02 0.05 0.21068 0.30549 314.27 327.24
 1984 12 0.00092 0.20595 0.87486 337.07 0.1 0.16640 0.21068 337.02 314.27
 1985 12 0.00092 0.19274 0.89271 322.5 0.08 0.20595 0.16640 337.07 337.02
 1986 12 0.00084 0.39087 0.89481 323.33 0.07 0.19274 0.20595 322.5 337.07
 1987 12 0.00093 0.38862 0.85294 318.72 0.07 0.39087 0.19274 323.33 322.5
 1988 12 0.00089 0.29969 0.87426 320.26 0.06 0.38862 0.39087 318.72 323.33
 1989 12 0.00083 0.33552 0.86455 326.33 0.05 0.29969 0.38862 320.26 318.72
 1990 12 0.00083 0.31937 0.89649 325.48 0.07 0.33552 0.29969 326.33 320.26
 1991 12 0.00084 0.31702 0.89690 323.58 0.07 0.31937 0.33552 325.48 326.33
 1992 12 0.00084 0.33533 0.89717 322.85 0.07 0.31702 0.31937 323.58 325.48
 1993 12 0.00084 0.25065 0.90296 321.2 0.07 0.33533 0.31702 322.85 323.58
 1994 12 0.00083 0.20570 0.92487 310.79 0.06 0.25065 0.33533 321.2 322.85
 1995 12 0.00085 0.13448 0.94203 302.94 0.06 0.20570 0.25065 310.79 321.2
 1996 12 0.00086 0.10443 0.95566 299.25 0.06 0.13448 0.20570 302.94 310.79
 1997 12 0.00080 0.10707 0.98161 303.46 0.06 0.10443 0.13448 299.25 302.94
 1998 12 0.00085 0.10307 0.98311 303.78 0.06 0.10707 0.10443 303.46 299.25
 1999 12 0.00086 0.08406 0.96273 312.89 0.06 0.10307 0.10707 303.78 303.46
 2000 12 0.00089 0.11636 0.94616 319.86 0.07 0.08406 0.10307 312.89 303.78
Ghana 1970 13 0.00138 0.02321 1.15649 283.54 0.11 0.11636 0.08406 319.86 312.89
 1971 13 0.00111 0.02120 1.13441 291.05 0.11 0.02321 0.11636 283.54 319.86
 1972 13 0.00122 0.02242 1.22612 276.09 0.11 0.02120 0.02321 291.05 283.54
 1973 13 0.00122 0.01521 1.26170 276.08 0.12 0.02242 0.02120 276.09 291.05
 1974 13 0.00136 0.01264 1.24484 287.21 0.13 0.01521 0.02242 276.08 276.09
 1975 13 0.00149 0.04938 1.47401 245.65 0.14 0.01264 0.01521 287.21 276.08
 1976 13 0.00134 0.02535 1.52832 232.34 0.13 0.04938 0.01264 245.65 287.21
 1977 13 0.00162 0.03635 1.58220 233.58 0.14 0.02535 0.04938 232.34 245.65
 1978 13 0.00146 0.04167 1.45340 249.12 0.09 0.03635 0.02535 233.58 232.34
 1979 13 0.00136 0.06410 1.50494 238.07 0.09 0.04167 0.03635 249.12 233.58
 1980 13 0.00127 0.07235 1.54076 233.32 0.08 0.06410 0.04167 238.07 249.12
 1981 13 0.00155 0.05663 1.66705 218.44 0.09 0.07235 0.06410 233.32 238.07
 1982 13 0.00165 0.05858 1.83957 196.47 0.09 0.05663 0.07235 218.44 233.32
 1983 13 0.00209 0.04795 1.63605 180.82 0.1 0.05858 0.05663 196.47 218.44
 1984 13 0.00135 0.08678 1.60438 189.55 0.06 0.04795 0.05858 180.82 196.47
 1985 13 0.00168 0.07528 1.69944 192.61 0.12 0.08678 0.04795 189.55 180.82
 XXIV
 1986 13 0.00151 0.13218 1.67587 196.4 0.11 0.07528 0.08678 192.61 189.55
 1987 13 0.00149 0.14375 1.73236 199.86 0.1 0.13218 0.07528 196.4 192.61
 1988 13 0.00145 0.14279 1.60674 205.26 0.1 0.14375 0.13218 199.86 196.4
 1989 13 0.00135 0.22656 1.64970 209.79 0.1 0.14279 0.14375 205.26 199.86
 1990 13 0.00154 0.17152 1.63542 210.82 0.1 0.22656 0.14279 209.79 205.26
 1991 13 0.00150 0.25573 1.60437 215.81 0.09 0.17152 0.22656 210.82 209.79
 1992 13 0.00149 0.17169 1.60158 218.01 0.09 0.25573 0.17152 215.81 210.82
 1993 13 0.00164 0.16615 1.59895 222.39 0.09 0.17169 0.25573 218.01 215.81
 1994 13 0.00175 0.14131 1.61140 223.7 0.09 0.16615 0.17169 222.39 218.01
 1995 13 0.00179 0.16111 1.62255 227.05 0.09 0.14131 0.16615 223.7 222.39
 1996 13 0.00181 0.15421 1.60504 231.82 0.09 0.16111 0.14131 227.05 223.7
 1997 13 0.00195 0.12110 1.61747 236.01 0.09 0.15421 0.16111 231.82 227.05
 1998 13 0.00185 0.15008 1.62564 241.61 0.09 0.12110 0.15421 236.01 231.82
 1999 13 0.00181 0.12710 1.61671 246.73 0.09 0.15008 0.12110 241.61 236.01
 2000 13 0.00167 0.12063 1.58645 250.27 0.09 0.12710 0.15008 246.73 241.61
Kenya 1970 14 0.00116 0.01749 2.23888 291.02 0.12 0.12063 0.12710 250.27 246.73
 1971 14 0.00122 0.01667 1.92089 343.18 0.13 0.01749 0.12063 291.02 250.27
 1972 14 0.00108 0.01532 1.69430 387.63 0.11 0.01667 0.01749 343.18 291.02
 1973 14 0.00102 0.01910 1.63699 395.83 0.11 0.01532 0.01667 387.63 343.18
 1974 14 0.00123 0.02254 1.60879 397.1 0.13 0.01910 0.01532 395.83 387.63
 1975 14 0.00126 0.02393 1.62982 386.11 0.13 0.02254 0.01910 397.1 395.83
 1976 14 0.00117 0.02902 1.65027 380.12 0.11 0.02393 0.02254 386.11 397.1
 1977 14 0.00118 0.02756 1.55485 400.94 0.11 0.02902 0.02393 380.12 386.11
 1978 14 0.00115 0.03937 1.48978 413 0.11 0.02756 0.02902 400.94 380.12
 1979 14 0.00101 0.05191 1.41907 428.09 0.11 0.03937 0.02756 413 400.94
 1980 14 0.00118 0.05551 1.38158 435.24 0.13 0.05191 0.03937 428.09 413
 1981 14 0.00121 0.06072 1.35567 434.78 0.13 0.05551 0.05191 435.24 428.09
 1982 14 0.00086 0.06450 1.34306 424.79 0.12 0.06072 0.05551 434.78 435.24
 1983 14 0.00085 0.05238 1.33644 414.28 0.12 0.06450 0.06072 424.79 434.78
 1984 14 0.00077 0.05237 1.36991 405.96 0.12 0.05238 0.06450 414.28 424.79
 1985 14 0.00063 0.05316 1.35340 407.98 0.12 0.05237 0.05238 405.96 414.28
 1986 14 0.00064 0.05150 1.34612 421.59 0.12 0.05316 0.05237 407.98 405.96
 1987 14 0.00075 0.06115 1.30436 430.9 0.12 0.05150 0.05316 421.59 407.98
 1988 14 0.00067 0.08597 1.24604 441.88 0.12 0.06115 0.05150 430.9 421.59
 1989 14 0.00070 0.10459 1.22015 447.06 0.12 0.08597 0.06115 441.88 430.9
 1990 14 0.00075 0.11190 1.18203 450.58 0.12 0.10459 0.08597 447.06 441.88
 1991 14 0.00061 0.08558 1.17050 442.53 0.11 0.11190 0.10459 450.58 447.06
 1992 14 0.00070 0.08312 1.20347 425.43 0.11 0.08558 0.11190 442.53 450.58
 1993 14 0.00078 0.08498 1.21677 414.22 0.1 0.08312 0.08558 425.43 442.53
 1994 14 0.00082 0.06171 1.13849 413.04 0.11 0.08498 0.08312 414.22 425.43
 1995 14 0.00087 0.06401 1.11914 419.6 0.1 0.06171 0.08498 413.04 414.22
 1996 14 0.00105 0.05021 1.08711 425.79 0.13 0.06401 0.06171 419.6 413.04
 1997 14 0.00094 0.03745 1.13550 417.35 0.12 0.05021 0.06401 425.79 419.6
 1998 14 0.00109 0.03359 1.16137 420.97 0.13 0.03745 0.05021 417.35 425.79
 1999 14 0.00109 0.02452 1.15936 420.82 0.12 0.03359 0.03745 420.97 417.35
 2000 14 0.00109 0.03948 1.16380 421.01 0.12 0.02452 0.03359 420.82 420.97
Liberia 1970 15 0.00166 0.01112 0.81047 836.55 0.04 0.03948 0.02452 421.01 420.82
 1971 15 0.00166 0.01047 0.80577 852.6 0.04 0.01112 0.03948 836.55 421.01
 1972 15 0.00161 0.01019 0.83591 862.53 0.04 0.01047 0.01112 852.6 836.55
 XXV
 1973 15 0.00150 0.00830 0.82802 818.82 0.05 0.01019 0.01047 862.53 852.6
 1974 15 0.00166 0.01120 0.84171 832.83 0.06 0.00830 0.01019 818.82 862.53
 1975 15 0.00159 0.01598 0.87013 780.34 0.05 0.01120 0.00830 832.83 818.82
 1976 15 0.00149 0.02007 0.81841 797.89 0.06 0.01598 0.01120 780.34 832.83
 1977 15 0.00144 0.02435 0.81665 787.36 0.06 0.02007 0.01598 797.89 780.34
 1978 15 0.00143 0.03316 0.87106 801.32 0.06 0.02435 0.02007 787.36 797.89
 1979 15 0.00179 0.05542 0.86136 802.22 0.08 0.03316 0.02435 801.32 787.36
 1980 15 0.00198 0.06978 0.76161 744.48 0.07 0.05542 0.03316 802.22 801.32
 1981 15 0.00194 0.07948 0.77209 703.29 0.05 0.06978 0.05542 744.48 802.22
 1982 15 0.00061 0.08156 0.88570 661.62 0.05 0.07948 0.06978 703.29 744.48
 1983 15 0.00073 0.08999 0.79213 627.42 0.05 0.08156 0.07948 661.62 703.29
 1984 15 0.00075 0.10234 0.70420 597.84 0.05 0.08999 0.08156 627.42 661.62
 1985 15 0.00077 0.07156 0.74852 582.48 0.04 0.10234 0.08999 597.84 627.42
 1986 15 0.00079 0.07787 0.76941 567.97 0.04 0.07156 0.10234 582.48 597.84
 1987 15 0.00084 0.06344 0.88823 561.79 0.05 0.07787 0.07156 567.97 582.48
 1988 15 0.00090 0.05326 0.91652 553.18 0.06 0.06344 0.07787 561.79 567.97
 1989 15 0.00099 0.06798 1.06006 409.41 0.06 0.05326 0.06344 553.18 561.79
 1990 15 0.00147 0.26268 1.97810 202.72 0.08 0.06798 0.05326 409.41 553.18
 1991 15 0.00100 0.42440 2.14780 176.46 0.05 0.26268 0.06798 202.72 409.41
 1992 15 0.00151 0.49605 2.77206 116.52 0.06 0.42440 0.26268 176.46 202.72
 1993 15 0.00257 0.75700 2.82672 78.89 0.06 0.49605 0.42440 116.52 176.46
 1994 15 0.00331 0.50147 3.61347 61.16 0.06 0.75700 0.49605 78.89 116.52
 1995 15 0.00359 1.01699 3.82166 56.52 0.06 0.50147 0.75700 61.16 78.89
 1996 15 0.00341 1.27250 3.65013 59.45 0.05 1.01699 0.50147 56.52 61.16
 1997 15 0.00168 0.27149 2.63158 112.86 0.03 1.27250 1.01699 59.45 56.52
 1998 15 0.00141 0.19824 2.26393 134.28 0.05 0.27149 1.27250 112.86 59.45
 1999 15 0.00123 0.21051 2.46431 153.39 0.05 0.19824 0.27149 134.28 112.86
 2000 15 0.00103 0.12018 2.13685 182.98 0.09 0.21051 0.19824 153.39 134.28
Madaga 1970 16 0.00043 0.01709 1.37471 405.01 0.1 0.12018 0.21051 182.98 153.39
 1971 16 0.00043 0.01607 1.38514 410.06 0.1 0.01709 0.12018 405.01 182.98
 1972 16 0.00058 0.01899 1.27537 394.35 0.11 0.01607 0.01709 410.06 405.01
 1973 16 0.00051 0.01872 1.13301 374.03 0.11 0.01899 0.01607 394.35 410.06
 1974 16 0.00055 0.02194 1.14020 371.55 0.13 0.01872 0.01899 374.03 394.35
 1975 16 0.00077 0.02836 1.27035 366.31 0.13 0.02194 0.01872 371.55 374.03
 1976 16 0.00043 0.02184 1.25584 345.65 0.12 0.02836 0.02194 366.31 371.55
 1977 16 0.00039 0.02108 1.16636 344.38 0.11 0.02184 0.02836 345.65 366.31
 1978 16 0.00046 0.03234 1.36665 326.2 0.11 0.02108 0.02184 344.38 345.65
 1979 16 0.00047 0.04460 1.28345 348.63 0.11 0.03234 0.02108 326.2 344.38
 1980 16 0.00071 0.07408 1.28341 341.8 0.11 0.04460 0.03234 348.63 326.2
 1981 16 0.00050 0.08327 1.43904 300.11 0.09 0.07408 0.04460 341.8 348.63
 1982 16 0.00047 0.08738 1.39143 286.44 0.09 0.08327 0.07408 300.11 341.8
 1983 16 0.00029 0.06536 1.42871 280.91 0.08 0.08738 0.08327 286.44 300.11
 1984 16 0.00039 0.05326 1.51781 277.67 0.11 0.06536 0.08738 280.91 286.44
 1985 16 0.00050 0.06472 1.50903 273.01 0.11 0.05326 0.06536 277.67 280.91
 1986 16 0.00050 0.10655 1.47949 270.58 0.11 0.06472 0.05326 273.01 277.67
 1987 16 0.00061 0.11236 1.47046 266.12 0.11 0.10655 0.06472 270.58 273.01
 1988 16 0.00056 0.09728 1.48961 267.48 0.13 0.11236 0.10655 266.12 270.58
 1989 16 0.00040 0.10966 1.65128 270.56 0.11 0.09728 0.11236 267.48 266.12
 1990 16 0.00040 0.12157 1.66481 271.13 0.11 0.10966 0.09728 270.56 267.48
 XXVI
 1991 16 0.00044 0.14876 1.62035 246.78 0.12 0.12157 0.10966 271.13 270.56
 1992 16 0.00045 0.11680 1.63898 242.56 0.12 0.14876 0.12157 246.78 271.13
 1993 16 0.00043 0.11430 1.62299 240.5 0.11 0.11680 0.14876 242.56 246.78
 1994 16 0.00042 0.09124 1.48247 233.34 0.11 0.11430 0.11680 240.5 242.56
 1995 16 0.00033 0.09320 1.50523 230.37 0.1 0.09124 0.11430 233.34 240.5
 1996 16 0.00053 0.10808 1.47972 228.34 0.11 0.09320 0.09124 230.37 233.34
 1997 16 0.00065 0.24481 1.48766 229.73 0.12 0.10808 0.09320 228.34 230.37
 1998 16 0.00064 0.13601 1.67143 231.67 0.12 0.24481 0.10808 229.73 228.34
 1999 16 0.00069 0.09688 1.67745 235.34 0.12 0.13601 0.24481 231.67 229.73
 2000 16 0.00079 0.08295 1.81398 239.43 0.12 0.09688 0.13601 235.34 231.67
Malawi 1970 17 0.00100 0.06694 4.44079 121.6 0.14 0.08295 0.09688 239.43 235.34
 1971 17 0.00098 0.04934 3.93712 137.41 0.14 0.06694 0.08295 121.6 239.43
 1972 17 0.00095 0.05331 3.73034 141.81 0.09 0.04934 0.06694 137.41 121.6
 1973 17 0.00106 0.04268 3.65031 140.81 0.13 0.05331 0.04934 141.81 137.41
 1974 17 0.00092 0.05568 3.39574 146.36 0.12 0.04268 0.05331 140.81 141.81
 1975 17 0.00099 0.07969 3.31007 150.45 0.13 0.05568 0.04268 146.36 140.81
 1976 17 0.00097 0.07445 3.27751 152.86 0.12 0.07969 0.05568 150.45 146.36
 1977 17 0.00096 0.09077 2.94175 155.01 0.12 0.07445 0.07969 152.86 150.45
 1978 17 0.00090 0.10297 2.71881 164.41 0.11 0.09077 0.07445 155.01 152.86
 1979 17 0.00189 0.14202 2.63095 166.1 0.16 0.10297 0.09077 164.41 155.01
 1980 17 0.00092 0.14737 2.64688 161.7 0.14 0.14202 0.10297 166.1 164.41
 1981 17 0.00082 0.14432 2.81265 148.97 0.14 0.14737 0.14202 161.7 166.1
 1982 17 0.00082 0.12387 2.76770 148.86 0.14 0.14432 0.14737 148.97 161.7
 1983 17 0.00081 0.11470 2.70270 150.22 0.14 0.12387 0.14432 148.86 148.97
 1984 17 0.00071 0.17097 2.62280 152.89 0.14 0.11470 0.12387 150.22 148.86
 1985 17 0.00071 0.10139 2.58857 152.98 0.14 0.17097 0.11470 152.89 150.22
 1986 17 0.00085 0.17573 2.71205 144.54 0.15 0.10139 0.17097 152.98 152.89
 1987 17 0.00088 0.24486 2.79386 138.16 0.17 0.17573 0.10139 144.54 152.98
 1988 17 0.00060 0.32365 2.84671 134.19 0.16 0.24486 0.17573 138.16 144.54
 1989 17 0.00063 0.35485 2.92615 129.18 0.18 0.32365 0.24486 134.19 138.16
 1990 17 0.00064 0.40256 2.84605 131.41 0.19 0.35485 0.32365 129.18 134.19
 1991 17 0.00062 0.40661 2.64573 139.47 0.18 0.40256 0.35485 131.41 129.18
 1992 17 0.00074 0.46076 2.82242 127.55 0.21 0.40661 0.40256 139.47 131.41
 1993 17 0.00068 0.36127 2.57019 138.9 0.16 0.46076 0.40661 127.55 139.47
 1994 17 0.00076 0.38126 2.84629 123.67 0.17 0.36127 0.46076 138.9 127.55
 1995 17 0.00066 0.30161 2.51458 142.37 0.16 0.38126 0.36127 123.67 138.9
 1996 17 0.00063 0.31821 2.35884 149.65 0.14 0.30161 0.38126 142.37 123.67
 1997 17 0.00062 0.21448 2.29870 151.39 0.14 0.31821 0.30161 149.65 142.37
 1998 17 0.00062 0.26089 2.35510 152.86 0.14 0.21448 0.31821 151.39 149.65
 1999 17 0.00062 0.26030 2.45607 153.09 0.13 0.26089 0.21448 152.86 151.39
 2000 17 0.00062 0.25593 2.55530 151.45 0.13 0.26030 0.26089 153.09 152.86
Mali 1970 18 0.00028 0.02128 1.48512 191.23 0.08 0.25593 0.26030 151.45 153.09
 1971 18 0.00028 0.02802 1.49254 190.95 0.08 0.02128 0.25593 191.23 151.45
 1972 18 0.00029 0.03351 1.45451 196.63 0.09 0.02802 0.02128 190.95 191.23
 1973 18 0.00026 0.06355 1.57021 188.51 0.08 0.03351 0.02802 196.63 190.95
 1974 18 0.00037 0.10591 1.65449 180.72 0.09 0.06355 0.03351 188.51 196.63
 1975 18 0.00034 0.11432 1.52563 196.64 0.07 0.10591 0.06355 180.72 188.51
 1976 18 0.00031 0.06195 1.38488 218.07 0.06 0.11432 0.10591 196.64 180.72
 1977 18 0.00036 0.07467 1.34593 226.61 0.06 0.06195 0.11432 218.07 196.64
 XXVII
 1978 18 0.00037 0.10802 1.37884 218.3 0.08 0.07467 0.06195 226.61 218.07
 1979 18 0.00034 0.11681 1.31585 235.59 0.05 0.10802 0.07467 218.3 226.61
 1980 18 0.00037 0.17083 1.46217 220.22 0.07 0.11681 0.10802 235.59 218.3
 1981 18 0.00039 0.15530 1.48876 205.54 0.07 0.17083 0.11681 220.22 235.59
 1982 18 0.00035 0.14915 1.60489 191.29 0.06 0.15530 0.17083 205.54 220.22
 1983 18 0.00041 0.14495 1.50826 195.59 0.07 0.14915 0.15530 191.29 205.54
 1984 18 0.00041 0.20729 1.50610 199.19 0.07 0.14495 0.14915 195.59 191.29
 1985 18 0.00039 0.27563 1.66541 172.33 0.07 0.20729 0.14495 199.19 195.59
 1986 18 0.00037 0.24789 1.60070 182.42 0.07 0.27563 0.20729 172.33 199.19
 1987 18 0.00040 0.24414 1.68181 177.19 0.09 0.24789 0.27563 182.42 172.33
 1988 18 0.00038 0.29160 1.61777 175.55 0.09 0.24414 0.24789 177.19 182.42
 1989 18 0.00035 0.26892 1.46237 191.47 0.09 0.29160 0.24414 175.55 177.19
 1990 18 0.00037 0.29385 1.53309 183.29 0.09 0.26892 0.29160 191.47 175.55
 1991 18 0.00037 0.27144 1.49821 181.55 0.09 0.29385 0.26892 183.29 191.47
 1992 18 0.00035 0.23934 1.46652 191.61 0.07 0.27144 0.29385 181.55 183.29
 1993 18 0.00037 0.20542 1.49507 182.6 0.08 0.23934 0.27144 191.61 181.55
 1994 18 0.00038 0.24810 1.12040 179.4 0.08 0.20542 0.23934 182.6 191.61
 1995 18 0.00036 0.28675 1.12135 185.49 0.08 0.24810 0.20542 179.4 182.6
 1996 18 0.00036 0.25201 1.12137 186.38 0.08 0.28675 0.24810 185.49 179.4
 1997 18 0.00035 0.20680 1.11530 193.67 0.04 0.25201 0.28675 186.38 185.49
 1998 18 0.00034 0.15795 1.10105 199.81 0.04 0.20680 0.25201 193.67 186.38
 1999 18 0.00033 0.15102 1.08973 207.39 0.04 0.15795 0.20680 199.81 193.67
 2000 18 0.00032 0.14828 1.10101 207.99 0.04 0.15102 0.15795 207.39 199.81
Mauritani 1970 19 0.00099 0.01278 1.07011 465.69 0.14 0.14828 0.15102 207.99 207.39
 1971 19 0.00090 0.02440 1.06312 463.1 0.13 0.01278 0.14828 465.69 207.99
 1972 19 0.00102 0.02246 0.97554 448.86 0.13 0.02440 0.01278 463.1 465.69
 1973 19 0.00113 0.05446 1.01349 418.14 0.14 0.02246 0.02440 448.86 463.1
 1974 19 0.00103 0.14900 0.92530 457.84 0.14 0.05446 0.02246 418.14 448.86
 1975 19 0.00112 0.11106 1.09773 423.91 0.15 0.14900 0.05446 457.84 418.14
 1976 19 0.00105 0.29847 0.96671 449.03 0.13 0.11106 0.14900 423.91 457.84
 1977 19 0.00113 0.26361 0.93431 429.91 0.14 0.29847 0.11106 449.03 423.91
 1978 19 0.00120 0.36727 1.06817 417.35 0.13 0.26361 0.29847 429.91 449.03
 1979 19 0.00120 0.24776 0.79667 426.75 0.13 0.36727 0.26361 417.35 429.91
 1980 19 0.00119 0.25321 0.93347 430.51 0.12 0.24776 0.36727 426.75 417.35
 1981 19 0.00121 0.29747 0.91994 434.67 0.13 0.25321 0.24776 430.51 426.75
 1982 19 0.00160 0.26702 0.96189 414.35 0.13 0.29747 0.25321 434.67 430.51
 1983 19 0.00171 0.24166 0.92329 419.64 0.14 0.26702 0.29747 414.35 434.67
 1984 19 0.00164 0.24537 0.85641 396.62 0.14 0.24166 0.26702 419.64 414.35
 1985 19 0.00119 0.28341 1.03217 399.14 0.13 0.24537 0.24166 396.62 419.64
 1986 19 0.00082 0.29923 0.96499 412.46 0.12 0.28341 0.24537 399.14 396.62
 1987 19 0.00562 0.24690 0.72837 410.97 0.13 0.29923 0.28341 412.46 399.14
 1988 19 0.00545 0.22956 0.97471 408.78 0.13 0.24690 0.29923 410.97 412.46
 1989 19 0.00458 0.30175 0.80673 418.69 0.12 0.22956 0.24690 408.78 410.97
 1990 19 0.00437 0.28936 0.96912 401.85 0.1 0.30175 0.22956 418.69 408.78
 1991 19 0.00443 0.26168 0.91996 399.42 0.11 0.28936 0.30175 401.85 418.69
 1992 19 0.00459 0.23594 0.84298 397.14 0.08 0.26168 0.28936 399.42 401.85
 1993 19 0.00438 0.36238 0.92522 410.12 0.1 0.23594 0.26168 397.14 399.42
 1994 19 0.00644 0.41431 1.16620 287.54 0.09 0.36238 0.23594 410.12 397.14
 1995 19 0.00417 0.24100 0.77692 414.6 0.08 0.41431 0.36238 287.54 410.12
 XXVIII
 1996 19 0.00392 0.26922 0.93201 427.13 0.09 0.24100 0.41431 414.6 287.54
 1997 19 0.00410 0.24555 0.77674 398.82 0.09 0.26922 0.24100 427.13 414.6
 1998 19 0.00332 0.16527 0.86714 398.62 0.09 0.24555 0.26922 398.82 427.13
 1999 19 0.00314 0.20585 0.88646 413.26 0.11 0.16527 0.24555 398.62 398.82
 2000 19 0.00311 0.19553 0.97571 408.83 0.09 0.20585 0.16527 413.26 398.62
Moza 1970 20 0.00246 0.00006 5.04882 170.43 0.12 0.19553 0.20585 408.83 413.26
 1971 20 0.00275 0.00006 4.73964 181.67 0.12 0.00006 0.19553 170.43 408.83
 1972 20 0.00238 0.00005 4.53820 182.07 0.12 0.00006 0.00006 181.67 170.43
 1973 20 0.00258 0.00006 4.54536 178.34 0.12 0.00005 0.00006 182.07 181.67
 1974 20 0.00229 0.00040 4.43048 176.85 0.12 0.00006 0.00005 178.34 182.07
 1975 20 0.00203 0.01067 4.21259 179.97 0.11 0.00040 0.00006 176.85 178.34
 1976 20 0.00171 0.03552 4.02223 181.32 0.09 0.01067 0.00040 179.97 176.85
 1977 20 0.00173 0.03827 3.85057 187.11 0.09 0.03552 0.01067 181.32 179.97
 1978 20 0.00182 0.04888 3.68954 185.98 0.1 0.03827 0.03552 187.11 181.32
 1979 20 0.00160 0.06580 3.60979 186.03 0.06 0.04888 0.03827 185.98 187.11
 1980 20 0.00189 0.07443 3.59619 186.35 0.07 0.06580 0.04888 186.03 185.98
 1981 20 0.00141 0.05950 3.35326 191.08 0.05 0.07443 0.06580 186.35 186.03
 1982 20 0.00155 0.09317 3.60082 173.88 0.05 0.05950 0.07443 191.08 186.35
 1983 20 0.00141 0.11188 4.23219 143.63 0.04 0.09317 0.05950 173.88 191.08
 1984 20 0.00123 0.14705 4.47330 132.2 0.04 0.11188 0.09317 143.63 173.88
 1985 20 0.00092 0.16924 4.41270 132.18 0.04 0.14705 0.11188 132.2 143.63
 1986 20 0.00074 0.24604 4.47521 128.68 0.05 0.16924 0.14705 132.18 132.2
 1987 20 0.00064 0.33974 3.86121 147.85 0.05 0.24604 0.16924 128.68 132.18
 1988 20 0.00067 0.43268 3.52610 160.35 0.09 0.33974 0.24604 147.85 128.68
 1989 20 0.00064 0.35677 3.27494 170.22 0.09 0.43268 0.33974 160.35 147.85
 1990 20 0.00056 0.43777 3.16101 169.68 0.1 0.35677 0.43268 170.22 160.35
 1991 20 0.00054 0.44560 2.99465 173.72 0.11 0.43777 0.35677 169.68 170.22
 1992 20 0.00062 0.66812 3.31372 153.61 0.12 0.44560 0.43777 173.72 169.68
 1993 20 0.00060 0.50377 3.16225 157.97 0.09 0.66812 0.44560 153.61 173.72
 1994 20 0.00058 0.48023 2.75676 162.84 0.08 0.50377 0.66812 157.97 153.61
 1995 20 0.00058 0.41191 2.63622 162.68 0.09 0.48023 0.50377 162.84 157.97
 1996 20 0.00048 0.32156 2.45897 168.77 0.09 0.41191 0.48023 162.68 162.84
 1997 20 0.00052 0.30989 2.23900 182.68 0.1 0.32156 0.41191 168.77 162.68
 1998 20 0.00047 0.30186 1.99070 201.02 0.09 0.30989 0.32156 182.68 168.77
 1999 20 0.00050 0.21718 1.89491 211.44 0.13 0.30186 0.30989 201.02 182.68
 2000 20 0.00044 0.22769 1.86812 214.81 0.13 0.21718 0.30186 211.44 201.02
Nigeria 1970 21 0.00004 0.00526 1.77754 382 0.03 0.22769 0.21718 214.81 211.44
 1971 21 0.00321 0.00466 1.60000 425 0.04 0.00526 0.22769 382 214.81
 1972 21 0.00321 0.00459 1.60140 429 0.04 0.00466 0.00526 425 382
 1973 21 0.00328 0.00304 1.58503 441 0.04 0.00459 0.00466 429 425
 1974 21 0.00297 0.00233 1.46960 477 0.03 0.00304 0.00459 441 429
 1975 21 0.00319 0.00275 1.61818 440 0.05 0.00233 0.00304 477 441
 1976 21 0.00293 0.00221 1.56009 466 0.05 0.00275 0.00233 440 477
 1977 21 0.00284 0.00210 1.54375 480 0.05 0.00221 0.00275 466 440
 1978 21 0.00333 0.00221 1.71690 438 0.07 0.00210 0.00221 480 466
 1979 21 0.00324 0.00035 1.67181 454 0.09 0.00221 0.00210 438 480
 1980 21 0.00300 0.00172 1.67826 460 0.08 0.00035 0.00221 454 438
 1981 21 0.00272 0.00224 2.02577 388 0.08 0.00172 0.00035 460 454
 1982 21 0.00398 0.00114 2.12732 377 0.1 0.00224 0.00172 388 460
 XXIX
 1983 21 0.00396 0.00187 2.30747 348 0.1 0.00114 0.00224 377 388
 1984 21 0.00516 0.00124 2.43789 322 0.11 0.00187 0.00114 348 377
 1985 21 0.00377 0.00023 2.29361 344 0.09 0.00124 0.00187 322 348
 1986 21 0.00443 0.00178 2.26316 342 0.09 0.00023 0.00124 344 322
 1987 21 0.00414 0.00282 2.36970 330 0.07 0.00178 0.00023 342 344
 1988 21 0.00425 0.00388 2.22380 353 0.08 0.00282 0.00178 330 342
 1989 21 0.00004 0.01087 2.14986 367 0.05 0.00388 0.00282 353 330
 1990 21 0.00354 0.00883 2.02850 386 0.06 0.01087 0.00388 367 353
 1991 21 0.00003 0.00832 2.02799 393 0.04 0.00883 0.01087 386 367
 1992 21 0.00271 0.00810 2.05838 394 0.04 0.00832 0.00883 393 386
 1993 21 0.00349 0.00737 2.05371 391 0.04 0.00810 0.00832 394 393
 1994 21 0.00004 0.00606 1.99738 381 0.05 0.00737 0.00810 391 394
 1995 21 0.00014 0.00535 2.03150 381 0.05 0.00606 0.00737 381 391
 1996 21 0.00003 0.00519 2.01809 387 0.05 0.00535 0.00606 381 381
 1997 21 0.00000 0.00517 2.01809 387 0.05 0.00519 0.00535 387 381
 1998 21 0.00004 0.00509 1.96623 385 0.05 0.00517 0.00519 387 387
 1999 21 0.00004 0.00389 1.97895 380 0.05 0.00509 0.00517 385 387
 2000 21 0.00003 0.00269 1.94118 391 0.04 0.00389 0.00509 380 385
Senegal 1970 22 0.00006 0.02016 0.63677 446 0.13 0.00269 0.00389 391 380
 1971 22 0.00003 0.02547 0.65820 433 0.12 0.02016 0.00269 446 391
 1972 22 0.00003 0.02208 0.63839 448 0.12 0.02547 0.02016 433 446
 1973 22 0.00007 0.03832 0.72019 411 0.12 0.02208 0.02547 448 433
 1974 22 0.00013 0.06546 0.71875 416 0.12 0.03832 0.02208 411 448
 1975 22 0.00006 0.05885 0.68807 436 0.13 0.06546 0.03832 416 411
 1976 22 0.00003 0.04739 0.65227 463 0.1 0.05885 0.06546 436 416
 1977 22 0.00009 0.05089 0.69318 440 0.11 0.04739 0.05885 463 436
 1978 22 0.00016 0.09194 0.73058 412 0.13 0.05089 0.04739 440 463
 1979 22 0.00006 0.12100 0.72093 430 0.1 0.09194 0.05089 412 440
 1980 22 0.00316 0.10847 0.79310 406 0.11 0.12100 0.09194 430 412
 1981 22 0.00360 0.16351 0.78462 390 0.12 0.10847 0.12100 406 430
 1982 22 0.00019 0.10274 0.70091 438 0.1 0.16351 0.10847 390 406
 1983 22 0.00003 0.11196 0.67972 434 0.09 0.10274 0.16351 438 390
 1984 22 0.00007 0.13435 0.74074 405 0.13 0.11196 0.10274 434 438
 1985 22 0.00003 0.09998 0.70343 408 0.12 0.13435 0.11196 405 434
 1986 22 0.00010 0.19568 0.70531 414 0.13 0.09998 0.13435 408 405
 1987 22 0.00006 0.21768 0.71292 418 0.13 0.19568 0.09998 414 408
 1988 22 0.00010 0.18646 0.66667 426 0.13 0.21768 0.19568 418 414
 1989 22 0.00003 0.22331 0.68627 408 0.13 0.18646 0.21768 426 418
 1990 22 0.00007 0.24740 0.68370 411 0.13 0.22331 0.18646 408 426
 1991 22 0.00003 0.19093 0.68342 398 0.13 0.24740 0.22331 411 408
 1992 22 0.00014 0.19955 0.70960 396 0.13 0.19093 0.24740 398 411
 1993 22 0.00014 0.15127 0.72414 377 0.14 0.19955 0.19093 396 398
 1994 22 0.00004 0.19024 0.53175 378 0.13 0.15127 0.19955 377 396
 1995 22 0.00007 0.18558 0.53747 387 0.13 0.19024 0.15127 378 377
 1996 22 0.00003 0.15453 0.52645 397 0.13 0.18558 0.19024 387 378
 1997 22 0.00003 0.10903 0.54000 400 0.13 0.15453 0.18558 397 387
 1998 22 0.00003 0.12575 0.54054 407 0.13 0.10903 0.15453 400 397
 1999 22 0.00006 0.12517 0.53555 422 0.13 0.12575 0.10903 407 400
 2000 22 0.00009 0.09595 0.53630 427 0.13 0.12517 0.12575 422 407
 XXX
SA 1970 23 0.00299 0.00000 0.64143 3104 0.23 0.09595 0.12517 427 422
 1971 23 0.00294 0.00000 0.63389 3163 0.22 0.00000 0.09595 3104 427
 1972 23 0.00301 0.00000 0.63538 3143 0.23 0.00000 0.00000 3163 3104
 1973 23 0.00298 0.00000 0.64550 3213 0.22 0.00000 0.00000 3143 3163
 1974 23 0.00292 0.00000 0.63437 3334 0.21 0.00000 0.00000 3213 3143
 1975 23 0.00289 0.00000 0.65862 3316 0.21 0.00000 0.00000 3334 3213
 1976 23 0.00331 0.00000 0.66647 3319 0.23 0.00000 0.00000 3316 3334
 1977 23 0.00306 0.00000 0.67622 3246 0.21 0.00000 0.00000 3319 3316
 1978 23 0.00298 0.00000 0.69374 3275 0.21 0.00000 0.00000 3246 3319
 1979 23 0.00330 0.00000 0.69113 3325 0.22 0.00000 0.00000 3275 3246
 1980 23 0.00325 0.00000 0.68496 3463 0.22 0.00000 0.00000 3325 3275
 1981 23 0.00343 0.00000 0.71637 3561 0.24 0.00000 0.00000 3463 3325
 1982 23 0.00334 0.00000 0.78324 3460 0.24 0.00000 0.00000 3561 3463
 1983 23 0.00381 0.00000 0.81118 3310 0.23 0.00000 0.00000 3460 3561
 1984 23 0.00363 0.00000 0.83746 3390 0.21 0.00000 0.00000 3310 3460
 1985 23 0.00364 0.00000 0.84922 3263 0.22 0.00000 0.00000 3390 3310
 1986 23 0.00391 0.00000 0.88620 3181 0.22 0.00000 0.00000 3263 3390
 1987 23 0.00385 0.00000 0.89517 3167 0.22 0.00000 0.00000 3181 3263
 1988 23 0.00379 0.00000 0.89668 3223 0.23 0.00000 0.00000 3167 3181
 1989 23 0.00375 0.00000 0.83731 3227 0.23 0.00000 0.00000 3223 3167
 1990 23 0.00352 0.00000 0.82234 3152 0.24 0.00000 0.00000 3227 3223
 1991 23 0.00368 0.00000 0.86878 3056 0.23 0.00000 0.00000 3152 3227
 1992 23 0.00368 0.00000 0.83237 2929 0.22 0.00000 0.00000 3056 3152
 1993 23 0.00378 0.00252 0.87048 2903 0.21 0.00000 0.00000 2929 3056
 1994 23 0.00379 0.00271 0.88821 2934 0.21 0.00252 0.00000 2903 2929
 1995 23 0.00381 0.00339 0.89899 2960 0.21 0.00271 0.00252 2934 2903
 1996 23 0.00372 0.00307 0.87583 3020 0.2 0.00339 0.00271 2960 2934
 1997 23 0.00369 0.00391 0.87228 3030 0.2 0.00307 0.00339 3020 2960
 1998 23 0.00377 0.00404 0.87798 2975 0.19 0.00391 0.00307 3030 3020
 1999 23 0.00379 0.00445 0.85767 2972 0.19 0.00404 0.00391 2975 3030
 2000 23 0.00333 0.00376 0.84967 3020 0.19 0.00445 0.00404 2972 2975
Sudan 1970 24 0.00010 0.00292 1.71910 267 0.08 0.00376 0.00445 3020 2972
 1971 24 0.00005 0.00396 1.73585 265 0.07 0.00292 0.00376 267 3020
 1972 24 0.00006 0.01216 1.86123 245 0.07 0.00396 0.00292 265 267
 1973 24 0.00006 0.00887 1.92887 239 0.07 0.01216 0.00396 245 265
 1974 24 0.00005 0.03911 1.76744 258 0.07 0.00887 0.01216 239 245
 1975 24 0.00005 0.05066 1.49310 290 0.07 0.03911 0.00887 258 239
 1976 24 0.00004 0.04049 1.31098 328 0.06 0.05066 0.03911 290 258
 1977 24 0.00004 0.04760 1.27893 337 0.06 0.04049 0.05066 328 290
 1978 24 0.00004 0.06146 1.36364 308 0.06 0.04760 0.04049 337 328
 1979 24 0.00005 0.12325 1.47703 283 0.07 0.06146 0.04760 308 337
 1980 24 0.00005 0.11194 1.51439 278 0.07 0.12325 0.06146 283 308
 1981 24 0.00005 0.10301 1.43945 289 0.07 0.11194 0.12325 278 283
 1982 24 0.00005 0.11601 1.39527 296 0.07 0.10301 0.11194 289 278
 1983 24 0.00000 0.14696 1.41638 293 0.08 0.11601 0.10301 296 289
 1984 24 0.00005 0.09956 1.48519 270 0.08 0.14696 0.11601 293 296
 1985 24 0.00005 0.19508 1.65447 246 0.09 0.09956 0.14696 270 293
 1986 24 0.00005 0.15601 1.59289 253 0.09 0.19508 0.09956 246 270
 1987 24 0.00005 0.12883 1.37589 282 0.09 0.15601 0.19508 253 246
 XXXI
 1988 24 0.00005 0.13384 1.46377 276 0.08 0.12883 0.15601 282 253
 1989 24 0.00005 0.09901 1.34694 294 0.07 0.13384 0.12883 276 282
 1990 24 0.00005 0.11456 1.50000 272 0.08 0.09901 0.13384 294 276
 1991 24 0.00005 0.11395 1.38811 286 0.08 0.11456 0.09901 272 294
 1992 24 0.00005 0.06648 1.30537 298 0.08 0.11395 0.11456 286 272
 1993 24 0.00004 0.05270 1.21382 304 0.07 0.06648 0.11395 298 286
 1994 24 0.00005 0.04740 1.39000 300 0.08 0.05270 0.06648 304 298
 1995 24 0.00004 0.02558 1.31613 310 0.09 0.04740 0.05270 300 304
 1996 24 0.00004 0.02296 1.43302 321 0.09 0.02558 0.04740 310 300
 1997 24 0.00004 0.01246 1.42342 333 0.09 0.02296 0.02558 321 310
 1998 24 0.00004 0.01948 1.35159 347 0.09 0.01246 0.02296 333 321
 1999 24 0.00004 0.02164 1.15833 360 0.09 0.01948 0.01246 347 333
 2000 24 0.00004 0.01875 1.11436 376 0.08 0.02164 0.01948 360 347
Tanzania 1970 25 0.00000 0.02052 2.55924 211 0.04 0.01875 0.02164 376 360
 1971 25 0.00006 0.01855 2.31197 234 0.04 0.02052 0.01875 211 376
 1972 25 0.00006 0.01906 2.27039 233 0.04 0.01855 0.02052 234 211
 1973 25 0.00006 0.02906 2.09796 245 0.08 0.01906 0.01855 233 234
 1974 25 0.00005 0.04231 2.01215 247 0.08 0.02906 0.01906 245 233
 1975 25 0.00005 0.07060 1.91270 252 0.08 0.04231 0.02906 247 245
 1976 25 0.00005 0.06470 1.88048 251 0.09 0.07060 0.04231 252 247
 1977 25 0.00005 0.07830 1.80237 253 0.09 0.06470 0.07060 251 252
 1978 25 0.00005 0.09270 1.72587 259 0.08 0.07830 0.06470 253 251
 1979 25 0.00005 0.13008 1.77642 246 0.1 0.09270 0.07830 259 253
 1980 25 0.00006 0.14746 1.75410 244 0.1 0.13008 0.09270 246 259
 1981 25 0.00005 0.14430 1.66932 251 0.09 0.14746 0.13008 244 246
 1982 25 0.00005 0.13772 1.64800 250 0.1 0.14430 0.14746 251 244
 1983 25 0.00001 0.10907 1.57977 257 0.07 0.13772 0.14430 250 251
 1984 25 0.00005 0.09755 1.58498 253 0.07 0.10907 0.13772 257 250
 1985 25 0.00005 0.08410 1.57769 251 0.08 0.09755 0.10907 253 257
 1986 25 0.00005 0.11516 1.58065 248 0.08 0.08410 0.09755 251 253
 1987 25 0.00005 0.15319 1.55645 248 0.08 0.11516 0.08410 248 251
 1988 25 0.00005 0.16470 1.53414 249 0.07 0.15319 0.11516 248 248
 1989 25 0.00005 0.14220 1.51200 250 0.06 0.16470 0.15319 249 248
 1990 25 0.00005 0.16903 1.44402 259 0.09 0.14220 0.16470 250 249
 1991 25 0.00005 0.15609 1.44141 256 0.09 0.16903 0.14220 259 250
 1992 25 0.00005 0.18859 1.45161 248 0.08 0.15609 0.16903 256 259
 1993 25 0.00006 0.13255 1.46914 243 0.07 0.18859 0.15609 248 256
 1994 25 0.00006 0.13259 1.47280 239 0.07 0.13255 0.18859 243 248
 1995 25 0.00006 0.11721 1.49167 240 0.07 0.13259 0.13255 239 243
 1996 25 0.00006 0.11147 1.44082 245 0.07 0.11721 0.13259 240 239
 1997 25 0.00005 0.11692 1.40891 247 0.07 0.11147 0.11721 245 240
 1998 25 0.00005 0.11813 1.43426 251 0.07 0.11692 0.11147 247 245
 1999 25 0.00005 0.11528 1.48032 254 0.07 0.11813 0.11692 251 247
 2000 25 0.00005 0.11165 1.48276 261 0.07 0.11528 0.11813 254 251
Togo 1970 26 0.00000 0.02768 1.12458 297 0.08 0.11165 0.11528 261 254
 1971 26 0.00005 0.03052 1.14634 287 0.09 0.02768 0.11165 297 261
 1972 26 0.00009 0.02960 1.08970 301 0.09 0.03052 0.02768 287 297
 1973 26 0.00004 0.03599 1.05263 304 0.09 0.02960 0.03052 301 287
 1974 26 0.00004 0.05141 1.00000 312 0.06 0.03599 0.02960 304 301
 XXXII
 1975 26 0.00004 0.05413 1.01923 312 0.07 0.05141 0.03599 312 304
 1976 26 0.00009 0.05822 1.04362 298 0.07 0.05413 0.05141 312 312
 1977 26 0.00004 0.08083 1.03205 312 0.06 0.05822 0.05413 298 312
 1978 26 0.00004 0.11550 0.95562 338 0.06 0.08083 0.05822 312 298
 1979 26 0.00004 0.13032 1.04808 312 0.07 0.11550 0.08083 338 312
 1980 26 0.00004 0.09179 0.92197 346 0.08 0.13032 0.11550 312 338
 1981 26 0.00004 0.06885 0.97214 323 0.07 0.09179 0.13032 346 312
 1982 26 0.00004 0.08678 1.05980 301 0.07 0.06885 0.09179 323 346
 1983 26 0.00000 0.13143 1.09524 273 0.07 0.08678 0.06885 301 323
 1984 26 0.00005 0.12270 1.07914 278 0.08 0.13143 0.08678 273 301
 1985 26 0.00005 0.11784 1.04255 282 0.07 0.12270 0.13143 278 273
 1986 26 0.00005 0.17578 1.11552 277 0.07 0.11784 0.12270 282 278
 1987 26 0.00005 0.12810 1.17910 268 0.08 0.17578 0.11784 277 282
 1988 26 0.00005 0.19729 1.12635 277 0.08 0.12810 0.17578 268 277
 1989 26 0.00005 0.18606 1.11828 279 0.08 0.19729 0.12810 277 268
 1990 26 0.00005 0.24230 1.35185 270 0.1 0.18606 0.19729 279 277
 1991 26 0.00005 0.18785 1.36399 261 0.11 0.24230 0.18606 270 279
 1992 26 0.00006 0.21657 1.42857 245 0.12 0.18785 0.24230 261 270
 1993 26 0.00007 0.10670 1.64039 203 0.12 0.21657 0.18785 245 261
 1994 26 0.00006 0.12322 1.57709 227 0.09 0.10670 0.21657 203 245
 1995 26 0.00011 0.17559 1.56303 238 0.1 0.12322 0.10670 227 203
 1996 26 0.00016 0.13187 1.62948 251 0.09 0.17559 0.12322 238 227
 1997 26 0.00020 0.09531 1.36101 277 0.09 0.13187 0.17559 251 238
 1998 26 0.00021 0.09954 1.40230 261 0.07 0.09531 0.13187 277 251
 1999 26 0.00016 0.05380 1.48450 258 0.06 0.09954 0.09531 261 277
 2000 26 0.00022 0.05310 1.55645 248 0.08 0.05380 0.09954 258 261
Zambia 1970 27 0.00241 0.00547 1.53249 554 0.11 0.05310 0.05380 248 258
 1971 27 0.00248 0.00934 1.61798 534 0.14 0.00547 0.05310 554 248
 1972 27 0.00247 0.00890 1.55417 563 0.15 0.00934 0.00547 534 554
 1973 27 0.00249 0.01615 1.64991 537 0.13 0.00890 0.00934 563 534
 1974 27 0.00253 0.02056 1.60980 551 0.14 0.01615 0.00890 537 563
 1975 27 0.00255 0.03279 1.55577 520 0.17 0.02056 0.01615 551 537
 1976 27 0.00281 0.02200 1.60300 534 0.18 0.03279 0.02056 520 551
 1977 27 0.00276 0.03960 1.64575 494 0.17 0.02200 0.03279 534 520
 1978 27 0.00287 0.06742 1.64865 481 0.21 0.03960 0.02200 494 534
 1979 27 0.00338 0.10473 1.71239 452 0.2 0.06742 0.03960 481 494
 1980 27 0.00267 0.11577 1.72727 451 0.18 0.10473 0.06742 452 481
 1981 27 0.00271 0.07983 1.65659 463 0.2 0.11577 0.10473 451 452
 1982 27 0.00283 0.11214 1.74943 435 0.21 0.07983 0.11577 463 451
 1983 27 0.00001 0.07663 1.82082 413 0.23 0.11214 0.07983 435 463
 1984 27 0.00003 0.08601 1.85427 398 0.23 0.07663 0.11214 413 435
 1985 27 0.00003 0.11540 1.85934 391 0.25 0.08601 0.07663 398 413
 1986 27 0.00004 0.16055 1.86352 381 0.25 0.11540 0.08601 391 398
 1987 27 0.00004 0.14406 1.83905 379 0.28 0.16055 0.11540 381 391
 1988 27 0.00003 0.15326 1.81026 390 0.33 0.14406 0.16055 379 381
 1989 27 0.00004 0.12118 1.82086 374 0.34 0.15326 0.14406 390 379
 1990 27 0.00004 0.15853 1.80886 361 0.36 0.12118 0.15326 374 390
 1991 27 0.00004 0.29057 1.84900 351 0.37 0.15853 0.12118 361 374
 1992 27 0.00004 0.34589 1.91369 336 0.37 0.29057 0.15853 351 361
 XXXIII
 1993 27 0.00004 0.27138 1.79943 349 0.28 0.34589 0.29057 336 351
 1994 27 0.00004 0.24640 1.98714 311 0.11 0.27138 0.34589 349 336
 1995 27 0.00005 0.71749 2.07797 295 0.11 0.24640 0.27138 311 349
 1996 27 0.00004 0.20172 1.92533 308 0.13 0.71749 0.24640 295 311
 1997 27 0.00004 0.19752 1.93891 311 0.13 0.20172 0.71749 308 295
 1998 27 0.00005 0.11416 2.00000 298 0.13 0.19752 0.20172 311 308
 1999 27 0.00005 0.19732 1.95302 298 0.12 0.11416 0.19752 298 311
 2000 27 0.00004 0.24502 1.93399 303 0.11 0.19732 0.11416 298 298
Zimbabwe 1970 28 0.00443 0.00002 1.62175 616 0.19 0.24502 0.19732 303 298
 1971 28 0.00415 0.00002 1.56636 648 0.18 0.00002 0.24502 616 303
 1972 28 0.00184 0.00016 1.47267 677 0.18 0.00002 0.00002 648 616
 1973 28 0.00399 0.00006 1.52239 670 0.21 0.00016 0.00002 677 648
 1974 28 0.00394 0.00019 1.44783 690 0.2 0.00006 0.00016 670 677
 1975 28 0.00204 0.00148 1.47023 655 0.2 0.00019 0.00006 690 670
 1976 28 0.00452 0.00152 1.54631 637 0.2 0.00148 0.00019 655 690
 1977 28 0.00240 0.00170 1.61217 575 0.19 0.00152 0.00148 637 655
 1978 28 0.00257 0.00266 1.65314 542 0.2 0.00170 0.00152 575 637
 1979 28 0.00302 0.00349 1.62362 542 0.2 0.00266 0.00170 542 575
 1980 28 0.00208 0.03633 1.50084 599 0.22 0.00349 0.00266 542 542
 1981 28 0.00212 0.03547 1.35285 649 0.22 0.03633 0.00349 599 542
 1982 28 0.00217 0.04152 1.32969 640 0.23 0.03547 0.03633 649 599
 1983 28 0.00212 0.04069 1.34560 625 0.21 0.04152 0.03547 640 649
 1984 28 0.00234 0.05924 1.39389 589 0.23 0.04069 0.04152 625 640
 1985 28 0.00225 0.04287 1.39604 606 0.2 0.05924 0.04069 589 625
 1986 28 0.00252 0.04064 1.44631 596 0.21 0.04287 0.05924 606 589
 1987 28 0.00488 0.05103 1.55422 581 0.23 0.04064 0.04287 596 606
 1988 28 0.00473 0.04484 1.46766 603 0.22 0.05103 0.04064 581 596
 1989 28 0.00469 0.04033 1.42345 614 0.26 0.04484 0.05103 603 581
 1990 28 0.00422 0.04970 1.39404 637 0.23 0.04033 0.04484 614 603
 1991 28 0.00419 0.05475 1.40763 655 0.27 0.04970 0.04033 637 614
 1992 28 0.00465 0.12241 1.58692 581 0.3 0.05475 0.04970 655 637
 1993 28 0.00478 0.07671 1.50348 574 0.23 0.12241 0.05475 581 655
 1994 28 0.00466 0.07735 1.36911 615 0.21 0.07671 0.12241 574 581
 1995 28 0.00275 0.06817 1.39339 605 0.21 0.07735 0.07671 615 574
 1996 28 0.00261 0.04740 1.25723 657 0.19 0.06817 0.07735 605 615
 1997 28 0.00242 0.04212 1.21353 665 0.18 0.04740 0.06817 657 605
 1998 28 0.00264 0.03087 1.20741 675 0.17 0.04212 0.04740 665 657
 1999 28 0.00290 0.03169 1.33230 644 0.17 0.03087 0.04212 675 665
 2000 28 0.00272 0.02365 1.35605 587 0.16 0.03169 0.03087 644 675
 
 
